Cases for Zip , California Northern District Bankruptcy Court

Ninth Circuit Cases

• In re Forshee

Bankr. D. Idaho - 09-42007 - 2010-09-16 - ,

Utah Debtor allowed to claim Idaho homestead rights despite postpeition statements that she never intended to reside there (with her estranged husband who intended to divorce her.

• In re Gebhart

9th Cir. - 621 F.3d 1206 - 2010-09-14 - 7 ,

Exemption amount is fixed at time of filing. Post-petition appreciation goes to trustee. Exemption amount is fixed at the time of filing. Trustee can claim non-exempt equity even after discharge, but before the case is closed. A Chapter 7 debtor will not be certain about the status of a homestead property until the case is closed (something that may not happen for several years after bankruptcy filing) or the trustee abandons the property.

"What is frozen as of the date of filing the petition is the value of the debtor's exemption, not the fair market value of the property claimed as exempt. See Hyman v. Plotkin (In re Hyman), 967 F. 2d 1316, 1320 n.9 (9th Cir. 1992). A number of our cases have held that, under the California exemption scheme, the estate is entitled to postpetition appreciation in the value of property a portion of which is otherwise exempt. See Alsberg v. Robertson (In re Alsberg), 68 F.3d 312, 314-15 (9th Cir. 1995); Hyman, 967 F.2d at 1321; Schwaber v. Reed (In re Reed), 940 F.2d 1317, 1323 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Viet Vu v. Kendall (In re Viet Vu), 245 B.R. 644, 647-48 (9th Cir. BAP 2000).

.....

The debtors argue that the result we reach today will lead to uncertainty about the status of exempt property and abuses by trustees. The facts of the Gebhart bankruptcy suggest that some of these concerns are legitimate. Gebhart remained in his home for five years after filing for bankruptcy, paying his mortgage and believing that his bankruptcy was finished when he received his discharge. Gebhart may have been mistaken in this belief, but his misapprehension was shared by his mortgage lender, which refinanced his home, apparently unaware of any claims on the property by the Trustee. A Chapter 7 debtor will not be certain about the status of a homestead property until the case is closed (something that may not happen for several years after bankruptcy filing) or the trustee abandons the property."

• In re Grimmett

Bankr. D.Idaho - No. 09-40642-JDP - 2010-03-24 - ,

The court ruled that debtor's right to receive alimony payments from ex-husband were exempt.

• In re Greene

9th Cir - 583 B.R. 614 - 2009-10-02 - na , na

Section 522(p) homestead limitation's 1215 day period runs from date of ownership of the property, not from the date of declaration of homestead.

• In re Bourguignon

Bankr. D.Idaho - 416 BR 745 - 2009-09-23 - 7 ,

Money that debtors deposited into a college savings account several days prior to filing for Chapter 7 relief was held as non-exempt property of the bankruptcy estate.

The court said, "Debtors' lack of ability to direct the investments or the funds in the College Account is not a sufficient restriction for Section 541(c)(2) purposes."

Other Circuits

• In re Walck

Bankr.M.D.Pa - 459 B.R. 208 - 2011-10-11 - 7 ,

$100,000 insuramce proceeds fully exempt as necessary for support for low income debtor with only a few more years till retirement. Federal exeption used. 522(d)(1)(C)

• In re Daley

Bankr.E.D.Tenn - 459 B.R. 270 - 2011-10-11 - ,

Debtor's IRA with Merrill Lynch was not exempt due to language in a standard Client Relationship Agreement which gave Merrill a Lien on all IRA funds used for Margin or borrowing. Debtor never did either, but the clause itself was enough to render the IRA not exempt, according to the judge.

• In re Nguyen and Trinh

Bankr.ED VA - Case No. 11-14125-BFK - 2011-09-02 - 7 ,

When a state opts out of federal exemptions, state law determines PROCEDURE as well as substance of exemptions. In this case, they did not file their homestead deed in time required by state law (within 5 days of the 341 meeting date.

• In re Bryan

Bankr. W.D. Missouri - No. 10-40330-drd7 - 2011-09-02 - ,

Missouri annuity statute is not an valid bankruptcy exemption because it does not contain the words "exempt" - Citing the 8th Cir ruling In re Benn, 491 F.3d 811; 814, 8th Cir., 2007

• Russell v. Healthmont of Missouri LLC

Mo: Court of Appeals W.D. - 348 SW 3d 784 - 2011-08-23 - ,

Missouri courts consistently hold that "[b]ecause unliquidated personal injury actions ... are not subject to attachment and execution prior to judgment and are not assignable, they can be (and generally are) exempted from the bankruptcy estate under Missouri law." Id.; Patrick, 825 S.W.2d at 13 ("Any property of the estate which is exempt from attachment and execution, under Missouri law, is an allowable exemption from the bankruptcy estate."); see also Gremminger v. Missouri Labor & Industrial Relations Comm'n, 129 S.W.3d 399, 403 n. 1 (Mo.App. E.D.2004) (noting that whether a tort is a personal tort or a property tort determines whether the cause of action can be exempted in bankruptcy proceedings in Missouri).

Nevertheless, the 8th Circuit, in In re Benn, 491 F.3d 811 (8th Cir.2007), for whatever reason, disregarded, this extensive Missouri case law interpreting § 513.427 as set forth, supra, and held that § 513.427 is "merely an `opt-out' statute" that does not create any exemptions under Missouri law and concluded that the Missouri legislature only meant to exempt property specifically identified by other statutes as exempt from attachment and execution. In re Benn, 491 F.3d at 814-15. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri followed the 8th Circuit's decision in concluding that property exempt from attachment and execution under Missouri common law was not exempt under § 513.427. In re Mahony, 374 B.R. at 719.[2] Of course, federal cases interpreting Missouri law "are not binding on this court interpreting our own state statute." Scott v. Blue Springs Ford Sales, Inc., 215 S.W.3d 145, 167 (Mo.App. W.D.2006).

Under Missouri law, an unliquidated, personal-injury claim can, if the proper 788*788 procedures are followed and conditions satisfied, be exempted from his bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 513.427.

• In re Scannell

Bankr.D.N.H - 453 B.R. 36 - 2011-07-26 - 7 ,

the fact that debtor did not claim full exemption on Schedule C does not prevent him from applying the full exemption in doing the lein-avoidance calculaitons under section 522(f)(2)(A)(iii).

• In re Magee

Banrk.S.D.N.Y. - 444 BR 254 - 2011-02-03 - ,

Exemptions taken in previous Chapter 7 do not bind the current Chapter 13 proceeding where N.Y. state exemptions had substantially increased between first and second filing. Coutt ruled debtor may claim new, higher exemption amounts.

• In re Fernandez

W.D.TX - 445 B.R. 790 - 2011-01-26 - ,

Debtor who left his Texas home to find work in Nevada for two years before returning to Texas and filing bankruptcy lost his Texas homestead exemption, and could not claim Nevada exemption either, according to this court (diverging from two other courts in the same district - In re Camp 396 B.R. 194, W.D.TX, 2008; In re Garrett, 435 B.R. 434, W.D.TX, 2010

• In re Burgio

Bankr W.D.N.Y - 441 B.R. 218 - 2010-12-23 - 7 ,

Debtor cannot compel trustee to abandon debtpr's partially exempt car. Good explanation of procedure when you have a partial exemption and how you lose your car.

• Danduran v. Kaler

B.A.P. 8th Cir. - 438 B.R. 658 - 2010-11-04 - ,

Court allowed debtor to claim as exempt $7000 deposited in bank account that held proceeds from sale of exempt homestead. Court said debtor's pre-bankruptcy exemption planning did not amount to fraud. $7000 was from sale of personal property sold when home was sold.
"In view of these principles and the Eighth Circuit's permissive approach to non-fraudulent, pre-bankruptcy planning,[9] we find the Debtor's establishment of a savings account for the specific purpose of depositing the proceeds of his homestead and his subsequent deposit into that account of the proceeds from the personal property (allegedly) sold with his homestead sufficient indicia of his intent to convert non-exempt personal property into exempt, homestead property. Because the record is devoid of any contrary evidence or evidence that the Debtor acted with fraudulent intent when he converted nonexempt property into exempt property, the Debtor is entitled to claim the entire $87,501.55 in his savings account as his homestead exemption claim."

• In re Murphy

Bankr. EW.D.NY - 434 BR 67 - 2010-07-14 - ,

GM vehicle voucher for employees is exempt
"the voucher is appropriately treated as partial compensation for this loss of future earnings. Accordingly, the voucher is exemptible under the New York Debtor & Creditor Law.

Section 282(3)(iv) states that compensation of loss of future earnings is exempt "to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor." In his papers, the trustee has challenged only the exemptible character of the voucher. Giving consideration only to the issue presented, the court will overrule the trustee's objection. To the extent that the trustee may wish now to make a further argument that the voucher is not reasonably necessary for the debtor's support, he may timely move for reconsideration of this decision."

• In re McLaughlin

Bankr. D.Mass. - No. 09-44714-JBR - 2010-03-18 - 13 ,

Massachusetts law merely requires that a homestead claimant "occupy or intend to occupy said home as a principal residence."

Even though the debtor allegedly intended to sell his home when he recorded the homestead, the exemption was valid because the debtor met the requirement (that is, he occupied the property as his principal residence at the time that he claimed the homestead).

• In re Chilton

Bankr. E.D.Tex. - 426 B.R. 612 - 2010-03-05 - 13 ,

Inherited funds from debtor's mother's IRA account were not exempt under Section 522(d)(12).

• In re Shumac

Bankr.M.D.Pa. - 425 B.R. 139 - 2010-03-04 - ,

Compensation from personal injury award was allowed as an exemption (under Section 522(d)(11)). Specifically, the court disagreed with the trustee's argument that the debtor's injury needed to be permanent in order to be exempt. The debtor's injuries caused him to miss work for three months, and still caused him pain two years after the accident were (according to the court) sufficiently severe to be exempt.

Note: the "asset" here is the right to the damages from the personal injury award.

• In re Olson

Bankr. E.D.Mich. - 424 B.R. 770 - 2010-03-01 - 7 ,

Debtor and her spouse are co-owners of the annuity, and their children are listed as beneficiaries. Court ruled that exemption Mich. Comp. Laws Section 500.4054 did not protect annuity owners against creditor claims against the non-beneficiary owners of the annuity.

"A straightforward reading of [Mich. Comp. Laws Section 500.4054] discloses that it does not protect the insured against claims his or her creditors make on the proceeds of the insurance or annuity fund. Rather, the statute protects the insurer from claims that beneficiaries' creditors make on the proceeds of the fund. This statute does not allow Debtor, the 'insured,' to exempt her interest in the annuity."

• In re Coulter

Bankr. M.D.Ga. - No. 09-50458 RFH - 2010-02-25 - 7 ,

The court did not allow debtors to exempt proceeds from a personal injury claim, because debtors intentionally and fraudulently attempted to conceal the claim.

• In re Rodrigues

Bankr. D.Mass. - Case No. 09-11960-JNF - 2010-02-23 - 7 ,

Debtor's home placed in a Living Trust had a valid homestead exemption.

• In re Miller

Bankr. M.D.Pa. - No. 1:09-bk-03336-MDF - 2010-02-05 - 13 ,

Debtor's alimony award from a divorce decree was exempt.

• Jackson v. Novak (In re Jackson)

2nd Cir. Conn. - 593 F.3d 171 - 2010-01-22 - ,

"Future earnings" under 522(d)(11)(E) referred only to post-petition earnings, not post-injury earnings that preceded petition.

• In re Jackson

2nd Cir - 593 F.3d 171 - 2010-01-22 - ,

Federal wages exemption 522(d)(11)(E) for "future earnings" only exempts wages that are postpetition and necessary for support. Here debtor claimed as exempt and entire 135K wrongful termination settlement as exempt wages. Court held that amount was exempt only to the extent that it was for postpetition earnings, and then only to the extent needed for support. Applying that standard, debtor was allowed to exempt only $16,550 of the court settlement.

• In re McComber

D.Mass - 422 B.R. 334 - 2010-01-12 - ,

Debtor could amend filing to switch from Federal to state homestead exemption (over objection of Trustee), but was limited by MA homestead law to the applying the homestead only to parcel that was described in the declaration of homestead, which did not include his adjoining parcel.

• In re Hall

Bankr. 10th Cir. - BAP No. KS-08-088 - 2009-12-04 - ,

Debtors may assert homestead exemption in property the own but don't live in, provided that family lives in the property.

• In re Connor

Bankr.E.D.N.C. - 419 B.R. 304 - 2009-11-19 - both , NA

Wife forced to take federal exemptions, husband forced to take state exemptions.

• In re Norra

Bankr. S.D Texas - 421 B.R. 782 - 2009-11-05 - N/A ,

Entire moblile home park was debtor's homestead.

• In re Archer

Bankr. S.D. Fla. - 416 B.R. 900 - 2009-10-02 - 7 ,

Debtors declined to use a homestead exemption (deciding to reaffirm their mortgage instead), and the court held that they could not then use a wild card exemption meant for debtors without ability to claim a homestead exemption. The court reasoned that "In the context of Fla.Stat. Section 222.25(4) [the wild card exemption statute], the phrase 'receive the benefits of'... refers to the legal right or advantage the Florida Constitution confers upon a homestead owner, regardless of whether the owner actually relies on the privilege."

• In re Fink

Bankr. S.D. Tex. - No. 07-36827-H3-7 - 2009-09-17 - ,

Court allowed debtor to take a "head of family" exemption even though he was living apart from his wife at the time, because he was still financially supporting his family.

• In re Holland

Bankr.N.D.Illinois - No. 05-58959 - 2009-09-03 - 7 ,

Applying and explaining Florida Tenancy by the Entireties exemption to a case in Illinois allowing debtor to exempt land owned in Florida.

• In re Sparks

Bankr.S.D.Texas - Case No. 09-30238-H3-7 - 2009-08-31 - ,

Full wild-card exemption allowed where value of homestead not established

• In re Campbell

Bankr.W.D.Mo. - No. 09-20020-DRD-7 - 2009-08-25 - 7 ,

The court found that debtors could not claim a homestead exemption for a property that debtors did not occupy (and could not at least establish an intent to occupy at a reasonably close time from their filing).

The court found that two years at a minimum (debtor's intended moving date) to be not reasonably close enough in time.

• In re Fadhli

Bankr.S.D.Tex. - No. 08-36892-H3-7 - 2009-08-10 - 7 ,

Court held that Section 522(p) applies only to the equity that the debtors have in their homesteads that they claim as exempt under state law. The federal homestead exemption is not limited by Section 522(p).

• In re Ramirez

Bankr.S.D.Texas - 413 B.R. 621 - 2009-06-24 - NA ,

• In re Henderson

Bankr. N.D.N.Y. - 423 BR 598 - 2009-05-27 - 7 ,

Court overruled creditor's objection to the debtor's homestead exemption. The court held that in order to sustain creditor's objection and reduce or eliminate the debtor's exemption, the court would need to find extraordinary circumstances. Here, there simply were none. Debtor's may have intentionally undervalued the claim, but this act of bad faith was not connected to the homestead exemption, so the objection was overruled.

• In re Hecker

Bankr. D.Minn. - 414 B.R. 499 - 2009-05-19 - 7 ,

Debtor could not reverse pierce the corporate veil to exempt homestead. As the court said, "This case demonstrates the danger of a debtor being able to raise or lower his corporate shield, depending on which position best protects his property."

• In re Cook

Bankr. S.D.Ohio - 406 B.R. 770 - 2009-02-04 - ,

Debtor was allowed to exempt money in her bank accounts that she could trace to having come from disability benefits.

• In re Marcus

Bankr. M.D.Ala. - Case No. 08-81050-WRS - 2009-02-04 - 13 ,

The court allowed debtor to apply the homestead exemption to the equity she had in the land adjacent to her residence. The court said a debtor must show both ownership and residence to claim a homestead exemption. Here, the debtor owned a one-eighth interest and used the parcel as part of her homestead. The court found that debtor's partial ownership was enough to satisfy the "ownership" requirement, and her use of the land contiguously with her residence satisfied the "residence" requirement."

• CFCU Community Credit Union v. Hayward (In re Hayward)

2d Cir. - 552 F.3d 253 - 2009-01-09 - 7 ,

The court ruled that a 2005 increase in the New York homestead exemption amount (from $10k to 50k) applied retroactively to debts acquired before the increase occurred. The court said, "Neither the statutory language nor its legislative history requires limiting the scope of the amendment to debts incurred after the amendment's effective date... Accordingly, New York debtors who file a bankruptcy petition after the amendment's effective date are entitled to invoke the greater homestead exemption amount of $50,000."

• In re Gosnick

Bankr. W.D.Mich. - 400 B.R. 582 - 2008-12-17 - 7 ,

Michigan law did not exempt homestead in Alabama. The court said, "Michigan courts, for almost one hundred years, have held that its laws do not have extraterritorial application to real property located in another state."

• In re Martinez

Bankr. E.D.N.Y. - 392 B.R. 530 - 2008-08-18 - ,

Debtor was allowed to claim a homestead exemption for the family home (even though the deed listed debtor's sister as the owner). The father had died without a will, and debtor held an ownership interest in the house and lived there at time of filing.

• In re Lowery

Bankr. N.D.Ga. - - 2007-09-24 - ,

Determined that state statute paralleling Sec 522(d)(11)(E) encompasses the lost future earnings portion of a tort award for personal injuries.

• In re Leahy

Bankr.D.Vt. - 70 BR 620 - 2007-07-03 - 7 , N/A

h funds in a 403(b) account are excluded from the bankruptcy estate and hence need not be exempted.

Section 541(b)(7) is a new provision, and neither the parties nor the Court has found any case that directly addresses the parameters of exclusion of 403(b) accounts from property of a bankruptcy estate. The Court has, however, found cases that discuss 401(k) employee benefit plans — the employee contributions of which are excluded under § 541(b)(7)(B)(i)(I). These cases arise in two contexts: motions to dismiss chapter 7 cases based upon an alleged abuse of the bankruptcy process, pursuant to § 707(b), see In re Zaporski, 366 B.R. 758, 2007 WL 1186032 (Bankr. E.D.Mich. Apr.17, 2007), and objections to confirmation in chapter 13 cases where the question is whether contributions or loan repayments to a qualified 401(k) retirement account, an ERISA-qualified savings plan, or a deferred compensation plan, are properly included in calculating disposable income, under § 1325(b)(2), see, e.g., In re Puetz, 370 B.R. 386, 2007 WL 1805482 (Bankr.D.Kan. June 22, 2007); In re Nowlin, 366 B.R. 670 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.2007); In, re Braulick, 360 B.R. 327 (Bankr.D.Mont. 2006); In re Devilliers, 358 B.R. 849 (Bankr.E.D.La.2007); In re Njuguna, 357 B.R. 689 (Bankr.D.N.H.2006); In re Thompson, 350 B.R. 770 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio 2006); In re McBride, 347 B.R. 585 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.2006). Since § 541(b)(7) treats contributions and loan repayments to qualified 401(k) retirement accounts, ERISA-qualified savings plans, and deferred compensation plans in the same way as 403(b) plans, those cases are instructive in analyzing the issue presented here, particularly since a "403(b) plan is analogous to a 401(k) plan, but is for employees of nonprofit organizations." In re Heffernan, 242 B.R. 812, 818 n. 2 (Bankr.D.Conn. 1999). As the Heffernan Court found, "references in the discussion to 401(k) plans, therefore, are equally relevant to 403(b) plans." Id.

These cases speak with one voice in concluding that, pursuant to § 541(b)(7), 401(k) or ERISA-qualified savings plan funds are not property of the bankruptcy estate. See In re Puetz, 370 B.R. 386, 624*624 2007 WL 1805482 at * 6 ("Further, § 541(b)(7) excepts from property of the estate any amount contributed to a qualified retirement plan, to the extent legally permitted."); In re Nowlin, 366 B.R. 670, at 675, 2007 WL 1095449 at * 4 ("Under 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(7), amounts given to ERISA qualified employee benefit plans (EBPs) do not constitute property of the estate."); In re Braulick, 360 B.R. at 331 ("This Court concludes that 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(7) excludes from the property of the estate any amounts withheld by the employer or paid by the employee for a deferred compensation plan that qualifies under 26 U.S.C. § 457 prior to the remission of such amounts to the deferred compensation fund . . ."); In re Devilliers, 358 B.R. at 864 ("Thus, mandatory or voluntary contributions to qualified retirement plans are not property of the estate . . ."); In re Njuguna, 357 B.R. at 690 ("Thus, property listed in section 541(b) does not become part of the bankruptcy estate. Section 541(b)(7) lists 401k contributions. Thus, 401(k) contributions are not property of the bankruptcy estate."); In re Thompson, 350 B.R. at 775 ("A 401(k) plan is owned by the debtor, even though the plan funds are not property of the estate . . ."); In re McBride, 347 B.R. at 595 ("[t]he Debtor's after-tax contributions to her ERISA-qualified Savings Plan are excluded from the bankruptcy estate because of the presence of the anti-alienation clause.").

***********
It follows, then, that if property is excluded from the bankruptcy estate, the Court need not determine whether such property may be exempt under 12 V.S.A. § 2740(16). "Exemptions come into play only when property is included in the bankruptcy estate and is sought to be used to satisfy the claims of creditors; by definition, excluded property never forms part of the bankruptcy estate and thus need not be tested for exempt status." In re Sewell, 180 F.3d 707, 710 (5th Cir.1999) (explaining that "[a]s the Debtor in the instant case has claimed — and the bankruptcy and district courts have allowed — the exclusion of her beneficial interest in the Plan from her bankruptcy estate [means that] we never reach the issue of exemptions.") (emphasis in original). Consequently, 625*625 the Trustee's contention that the Debtors failed to exempt the contributions made to Mrs. Leahy's 403(b) account within the year prior to filing (doc. # 79) fails because the contributions were never part of the bankruptcy estate in the first instance.

• In re Mitchell

Bankr.E.D.Va. - 2007 WL 1075195 - 2007-04-04 - 13 , Above

Debtor was unable to exempt her homestead because she did not properly claim a homestead exemption for the property. The court ruled that it was not enough to merely claim an exemption in the amount of the property's value -- the debtor had to claim the homestead itself.

• Cheeseman v. Nachman

4th Cir. - 656 F.2d 60 - 1981-07-30 - ,

Main Case on Doubling of Exemptions:
married couple filing a joint petition was entitled to double the Virginia homestead exemption

• In re Williamson

Bankr.10thCir - 20 CBN 312 - - ,

• Baker v. Tardif

11th Cir - __F.3d __ - - ,

• In re Hickmott

Bankr. E.D. Mich. - 20 CBN 30 - - 7 ,

Court sustained the trustee's objection to debtor's homestead exemption, because debtor had moved out voluntarily without an intention to return. Because of debtor's actions, she could not prove that she constructively occupied the property.

• In re Camp 396 B.R. 194

9/25/2008 - W.D.TX - - ,

Like Fernandez, but with a different result. Found that if a person was forced to take another state's exemption, if can apply to property outside that state, even if the state law, only applies to property within the state.

• In re Smith

Bankr.W.D. Mo. 2010 - 10-60388 - - ,

the debtor claimed as exempt his interest in a pension plan pursuant to §169.090 of the Missouri Statutes. That statute provides, in part, that "[n]either the funds belonging to the retirement system nor any benefit accrued or accruing ... shall be subject to execution, garnishment, attachment or any other process whatsoever...." The trustee objected on the grounds that this statute was not an exemption statute for bankruptcy purposes as defined in the Benn decision. The Smith court agreed, emphasizing the distinction made by the Eighth Circuit in Benn between the words "not subject to attachment and execution" and "exempt from attachment and execution." Simply put, in order to create an exemption for debtors in bankruptcy, the Missouri legislature must use that word. Id.

• In re Walck

Bankr.M.D.Pa - 459 B.R. 208 - 2011-10-11 - 7 ,

$100,000 insuramce proceeds fully exempt as necessary for support for low income debtor with only a few more years till retirement. Federal exeption used. 522(d)(1)(C)

• In re Daley

Bankr.E.D.Tenn - 459 B.R. 270 - 2011-10-11 - ,

Debtor's IRA with Merrill Lynch was not exempt due to language in a standard Client Relationship Agreement which gave Merrill a Lien on all IRA funds used for Margin or borrowing. Debtor never did either, but the clause itself was enough to render the IRA not exempt, according to the judge.

• In re Nguyen and Trinh

Bankr.ED VA - Case No. 11-14125-BFK - 2011-09-02 - 7 ,

When a state opts out of federal exemptions, state law determines PROCEDURE as well as substance of exemptions. In this case, they did not file their homestead deed in time required by state law (within 5 days of the 341 meeting date.

• In re Bryan

Bankr. W.D. Missouri - No. 10-40330-drd7 - 2011-09-02 - ,

Missouri annuity statute is not an valid bankruptcy exemption because it does not contain the words "exempt" - Citing the 8th Cir ruling In re Benn, 491 F.3d 811; 814, 8th Cir., 2007

• Russell v. Healthmont of Missouri LLC

Mo: Court of Appeals W.D. - 348 SW 3d 784 - 2011-08-23 - ,

Missouri courts consistently hold that "[b]ecause unliquidated personal injury actions ... are not subject to attachment and execution prior to judgment and are not assignable, they can be (and generally are) exempted from the bankruptcy estate under Missouri law." Id.; Patrick, 825 S.W.2d at 13 ("Any property of the estate which is exempt from attachment and execution, under Missouri law, is an allowable exemption from the bankruptcy estate."); see also Gremminger v. Missouri Labor & Industrial Relations Comm'n, 129 S.W.3d 399, 403 n. 1 (Mo.App. E.D.2004) (noting that whether a tort is a personal tort or a property tort determines whether the cause of action can be exempted in bankruptcy proceedings in Missouri).

Nevertheless, the 8th Circuit, in In re Benn, 491 F.3d 811 (8th Cir.2007), for whatever reason, disregarded, this extensive Missouri case law interpreting § 513.427 as set forth, supra, and held that § 513.427 is "merely an `opt-out' statute" that does not create any exemptions under Missouri law and concluded that the Missouri legislature only meant to exempt property specifically identified by other statutes as exempt from attachment and execution. In re Benn, 491 F.3d at 814-15. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri followed the 8th Circuit's decision in concluding that property exempt from attachment and execution under Missouri common law was not exempt under § 513.427. In re Mahony, 374 B.R. at 719.[2] Of course, federal cases interpreting Missouri law "are not binding on this court interpreting our own state statute." Scott v. Blue Springs Ford Sales, Inc., 215 S.W.3d 145, 167 (Mo.App. W.D.2006).

Under Missouri law, an unliquidated, personal-injury claim can, if the proper 788*788 procedures are followed and conditions satisfied, be exempted from his bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 513.427.

• In re Scannell

Bankr.D.N.H - 453 B.R. 36 - 2011-07-26 - 7 ,

the fact that debtor did not claim full exemption on Schedule C does not prevent him from applying the full exemption in doing the lein-avoidance calculaitons under section 522(f)(2)(A)(iii).

• In re Magee

Banrk.S.D.N.Y. - 444 BR 254 - 2011-02-03 - ,

Exemptions taken in previous Chapter 7 do not bind the current Chapter 13 proceeding where N.Y. state exemptions had substantially increased between first and second filing. Coutt ruled debtor may claim new, higher exemption amounts.

• In re Fernandez

W.D.TX - 445 B.R. 790 - 2011-01-26 - ,

Debtor who left his Texas home to find work in Nevada for two years before returning to Texas and filing bankruptcy lost his Texas homestead exemption, and could not claim Nevada exemption either, according to this court (diverging from two other courts in the same district - In re Camp 396 B.R. 194, W.D.TX, 2008; In re Garrett, 435 B.R. 434, W.D.TX, 2010

• In re Burgio

Bankr W.D.N.Y - 441 B.R. 218 - 2010-12-23 - 7 ,

Debtor cannot compel trustee to abandon debtpr's partially exempt car. Good explanation of procedure when you have a partial exemption and how you lose your car.

• In re Hurd

Bankr. Appellate Panel 8th Circuit - 441 BR 116 - 2010-12-15 - ,

A plain reading of the term "dwelling house" suggests that it does not include a trailer designed and constructed to move horses from one place to another. MO.REV.STAT. § 513.475.1
The Trailer does not qualify as a mobile home. It measures twenty feet long and six feet wide, meaning it contains only 120 square feet. Section 700.010(6) requires the structure to be eight feet wide and forty feet long or to contain three hundred and twenty or more square feet. Because the Trailer does not meet the threshold requirement under § 513.430.1(6) that it be a mobile home, we do not need to analyze whether the Trailer was used by the Debtor as his principal residence as required by § 513.430.1(6).

• Danduran v. Kaler

B.A.P. 8th Cir. - 438 B.R. 658 - 2010-11-04 - ,

Court allowed debtor to claim as exempt $7000 deposited in bank account that held proceeds from sale of exempt homestead. Court said debtor's pre-bankruptcy exemption planning did not amount to fraud. $7000 was from sale of personal property sold when home was sold.
"In view of these principles and the Eighth Circuit's permissive approach to non-fraudulent, pre-bankruptcy planning,[9] we find the Debtor's establishment of a savings account for the specific purpose of depositing the proceeds of his homestead and his subsequent deposit into that account of the proceeds from the personal property (allegedly) sold with his homestead sufficient indicia of his intent to convert non-exempt personal property into exempt, homestead property. Because the record is devoid of any contrary evidence or evidence that the Debtor acted with fraudulent intent when he converted nonexempt property into exempt property, the Debtor is entitled to claim the entire $87,501.55 in his savings account as his homestead exemption claim."

• In re Forshee

Bankr. D. Idaho - 09-42007 - 2010-09-16 - ,

Utah Debtor allowed to claim Idaho homestead rights despite postpeition statements that she never intended to reside there (with her estranged husband who intended to divorce her.

• In re Gebhart

9th Cir. - 621 F.3d 1206 - 2010-09-14 - 7 ,

Exemption amount is fixed at time of filing. Post-petition appreciation goes to trustee. Exemption amount is fixed at the time of filing. Trustee can claim non-exempt equity even after discharge, but before the case is closed. A Chapter 7 debtor will not be certain about the status of a homestead property until the case is closed (something that may not happen for several years after bankruptcy filing) or the trustee abandons the property.

"What is frozen as of the date of filing the petition is the value of the debtor's exemption, not the fair market value of the property claimed as exempt. See Hyman v. Plotkin (In re Hyman), 967 F. 2d 1316, 1320 n.9 (9th Cir. 1992). A number of our cases have held that, under the California exemption scheme, the estate is entitled to postpetition appreciation in the value of property a portion of which is otherwise exempt. See Alsberg v. Robertson (In re Alsberg), 68 F.3d 312, 314-15 (9th Cir. 1995); Hyman, 967 F.2d at 1321; Schwaber v. Reed (In re Reed), 940 F.2d 1317, 1323 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Viet Vu v. Kendall (In re Viet Vu), 245 B.R. 644, 647-48 (9th Cir. BAP 2000).

.....

The debtors argue that the result we reach today will lead to uncertainty about the status of exempt property and abuses by trustees. The facts of the Gebhart bankruptcy suggest that some of these concerns are legitimate. Gebhart remained in his home for five years after filing for bankruptcy, paying his mortgage and believing that his bankruptcy was finished when he received his discharge. Gebhart may have been mistaken in this belief, but his misapprehension was shared by his mortgage lender, which refinanced his home, apparently unaware of any claims on the property by the Trustee. A Chapter 7 debtor will not be certain about the status of a homestead property until the case is closed (something that may not happen for several years after bankruptcy filing) or the trustee abandons the property."

• In re Murphy

Bankr. EW.D.NY - 434 BR 67 - 2010-07-14 - ,

GM vehicle voucher for employees is exempt
"the voucher is appropriately treated as partial compensation for this loss of future earnings. Accordingly, the voucher is exemptible under the New York Debtor & Creditor Law.

Section 282(3)(iv) states that compensation of loss of future earnings is exempt "to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor." In his papers, the trustee has challenged only the exemptible character of the voucher. Giving consideration only to the issue presented, the court will overrule the trustee's objection. To the extent that the trustee may wish now to make a further argument that the voucher is not reasonably necessary for the debtor's support, he may timely move for reconsideration of this decision."

• In re Grimmett

Bankr. D.Idaho - No. 09-40642-JDP - 2010-03-24 - ,

The court ruled that debtor's right to receive alimony payments from ex-husband were exempt.

• In re McLaughlin

Bankr. D.Mass. - No. 09-44714-JBR - 2010-03-18 - 13 ,

Massachusetts law merely requires that a homestead claimant "occupy or intend to occupy said home as a principal residence."

Even though the debtor allegedly intended to sell his home when he recorded the homestead, the exemption was valid because the debtor met the requirement (that is, he occupied the property as his principal residence at the time that he claimed the homestead).

• In re Chilton

Bankr. E.D.Tex. - 426 B.R. 612 - 2010-03-05 - 13 ,

Inherited funds from debtor's mother's IRA account were not exempt under Section 522(d)(12).

• In re Shumac

Bankr.M.D.Pa. - 425 B.R. 139 - 2010-03-04 - ,

Compensation from personal injury award was allowed as an exemption (under Section 522(d)(11)). Specifically, the court disagreed with the trustee's argument that the debtor's injury needed to be permanent in order to be exempt. The debtor's injuries caused him to miss work for three months, and still caused him pain two years after the accident were (according to the court) sufficiently severe to be exempt.

Note: the "asset" here is the right to the damages from the personal injury award.

• In re Olson

Bankr. E.D.Mich. - 424 B.R. 770 - 2010-03-01 - 7 ,

Debtor and her spouse are co-owners of the annuity, and their children are listed as beneficiaries. Court ruled that exemption Mich. Comp. Laws Section 500.4054 did not protect annuity owners against creditor claims against the non-beneficiary owners of the annuity.

"A straightforward reading of [Mich. Comp. Laws Section 500.4054] discloses that it does not protect the insured against claims his or her creditors make on the proceeds of the insurance or annuity fund. Rather, the statute protects the insurer from claims that beneficiaries' creditors make on the proceeds of the fund. This statute does not allow Debtor, the 'insured,' to exempt her interest in the annuity."

• In re Coulter

Bankr. M.D.Ga. - No. 09-50458 RFH - 2010-02-25 - 7 ,

The court did not allow debtors to exempt proceeds from a personal injury claim, because debtors intentionally and fraudulently attempted to conceal the claim.

• In re Rodrigues

Bankr. D.Mass. - Case No. 09-11960-JNF - 2010-02-23 - 7 ,

Debtor's home placed in a Living Trust had a valid homestead exemption.

• In re Miller

Bankr. M.D.Pa. - No. 1:09-bk-03336-MDF - 2010-02-05 - 13 ,

Debtor's alimony award from a divorce decree was exempt.

• Jackson v. Novak (In re Jackson)

2nd Cir. Conn. - 593 F.3d 171 - 2010-01-22 - ,

"Future earnings" under 522(d)(11)(E) referred only to post-petition earnings, not post-injury earnings that preceded petition.

• In re Jackson

2nd Cir - 593 F.3d 171 - 2010-01-22 - ,

Federal wages exemption 522(d)(11)(E) for "future earnings" only exempts wages that are postpetition and necessary for support. Here debtor claimed as exempt and entire 135K wrongful termination settlement as exempt wages. Court held that amount was exempt only to the extent that it was for postpetition earnings, and then only to the extent needed for support. Applying that standard, debtor was allowed to exempt only $16,550 of the court settlement.

• In re McComber

D.Mass - 422 B.R. 334 - 2010-01-12 - ,

Debtor could amend filing to switch from Federal to state homestead exemption (over objection of Trustee), but was limited by MA homestead law to the applying the homestead only to parcel that was described in the declaration of homestead, which did not include his adjoining parcel.

• In re Hall

Bankr. 10th Cir. - BAP No. KS-08-088 - 2009-12-04 - ,

Debtors may assert homestead exemption in property the own but don't live in, provided that family lives in the property.

• In re Connor

Bankr.E.D.N.C. - 419 B.R. 304 - 2009-11-19 - both , NA

Wife forced to take federal exemptions, husband forced to take state exemptions.

• In re Norra

Bankr. S.D Texas - 421 B.R. 782 - 2009-11-05 - N/A ,

Entire moblile home park was debtor's homestead.

• In re Greene

9th Cir - 583 B.R. 614 - 2009-10-02 - na , na

Section 522(p) homestead limitation's 1215 day period runs from date of ownership of the property, not from the date of declaration of homestead.

• In re Archer

Bankr. S.D. Fla. - 416 B.R. 900 - 2009-10-02 - 7 ,

Debtors declined to use a homestead exemption (deciding to reaffirm their mortgage instead), and the court held that they could not then use a wild card exemption meant for debtors without ability to claim a homestead exemption. The court reasoned that "In the context of Fla.Stat. Section 222.25(4) [the wild card exemption statute], the phrase 'receive the benefits of'... refers to the legal right or advantage the Florida Constitution confers upon a homestead owner, regardless of whether the owner actually relies on the privilege."

• In re Bourguignon

Bankr. D.Idaho - 416 BR 745 - 2009-09-23 - 7 ,

Money that debtors deposited into a college savings account several days prior to filing for Chapter 7 relief was held as non-exempt property of the bankruptcy estate.

The court said, "Debtors' lack of ability to direct the investments or the funds in the College Account is not a sufficient restriction for Section 541(c)(2) purposes."

• In re Fink

Bankr. S.D. Tex. - No. 07-36827-H3-7 - 2009-09-17 - ,

Court allowed debtor to take a "head of family" exemption even though he was living apart from his wife at the time, because he was still financially supporting his family.

• In re Holland

Bankr.N.D.Illinois - No. 05-58959 - 2009-09-03 - 7 ,

Applying and explaining Florida Tenancy by the Entireties exemption to a case in Illinois allowing debtor to exempt land owned in Florida.

• In re Sparks

Bankr.S.D.Texas - Case No. 09-30238-H3-7 - 2009-08-31 - ,

Full wild-card exemption allowed where value of homestead not established

• In re Campbell

Bankr.W.D.Mo. - No. 09-20020-DRD-7 - 2009-08-25 - 7 ,

The court found that debtors could not claim a homestead exemption for a property that debtors did not occupy (and could not at least establish an intent to occupy at a reasonably close time from their filing).

The court found that two years at a minimum (debtor's intended moving date) to be not reasonably close enough in time.

• In re Fadhli

Bankr.S.D.Tex. - No. 08-36892-H3-7 - 2009-08-10 - 7 ,

Court held that Section 522(p) applies only to the equity that the debtors have in their homesteads that they claim as exempt under state law. The federal homestead exemption is not limited by Section 522(p).

• In re Ramirez

Bankr.S.D.Texas - 413 B.R. 621 - 2009-06-24 - NA ,

• In re Henderson

Bankr. N.D.N.Y. - 423 BR 598 - 2009-05-27 - 7 ,

Court overruled creditor's objection to the debtor's homestead exemption. The court held that in order to sustain creditor's objection and reduce or eliminate the debtor's exemption, the court would need to find extraordinary circumstances. Here, there simply were none. Debtor's may have intentionally undervalued the claim, but this act of bad faith was not connected to the homestead exemption, so the objection was overruled.

• In re Hecker

Bankr. D.Minn. - 414 B.R. 499 - 2009-05-19 - 7 ,

Debtor could not reverse pierce the corporate veil to exempt homestead. As the court said, "This case demonstrates the danger of a debtor being able to raise or lower his corporate shield, depending on which position best protects his property."

• In re Cook

Bankr. S.D.Ohio - 406 B.R. 770 - 2009-02-04 - ,

Debtor was allowed to exempt money in her bank accounts that she could trace to having come from disability benefits.

• In re Marcus

Bankr. M.D.Ala. - Case No. 08-81050-WRS - 2009-02-04 - 13 ,

The court allowed debtor to apply the homestead exemption to the equity she had in the land adjacent to her residence. The court said a debtor must show both ownership and residence to claim a homestead exemption. Here, the debtor owned a one-eighth interest and used the parcel as part of her homestead. The court found that debtor's partial ownership was enough to satisfy the "ownership" requirement, and her use of the land contiguously with her residence satisfied the "residence" requirement."

• CFCU Community Credit Union v. Hayward (In re Hayward)

2d Cir. - 552 F.3d 253 - 2009-01-09 - 7 ,

The court ruled that a 2005 increase in the New York homestead exemption amount (from $10k to 50k) applied retroactively to debts acquired before the increase occurred. The court said, "Neither the statutory language nor its legislative history requires limiting the scope of the amendment to debts incurred after the amendment's effective date... Accordingly, New York debtors who file a bankruptcy petition after the amendment's effective date are entitled to invoke the greater homestead exemption amount of $50,000."

• In re Gosnick

Bankr. W.D.Mich. - 400 B.R. 582 - 2008-12-17 - 7 ,

Michigan law did not exempt homestead in Alabama. The court said, "Michigan courts, for almost one hundred years, have held that its laws do not have extraterritorial application to real property located in another state."

• In re Martinez

Bankr. E.D.N.Y. - 392 B.R. 530 - 2008-08-18 - ,

Debtor was allowed to claim a homestead exemption for the family home (even though the deed listed debtor's sister as the owner). The father had died without a will, and debtor held an ownership interest in the house and lived there at time of filing.

• In re Lowery

Bankr. N.D.Ga. - - 2007-09-24 - ,

Determined that state statute paralleling Sec 522(d)(11)(E) encompasses the lost future earnings portion of a tort award for personal injuries.

• In re Leahy

Bankr.D.Vt. - 70 BR 620 - 2007-07-03 - 7 , N/A

h funds in a 403(b) account are excluded from the bankruptcy estate and hence need not be exempted.

Section 541(b)(7) is a new provision, and neither the parties nor the Court has found any case that directly addresses the parameters of exclusion of 403(b) accounts from property of a bankruptcy estate. The Court has, however, found cases that discuss 401(k) employee benefit plans — the employee contributions of which are excluded under § 541(b)(7)(B)(i)(I). These cases arise in two contexts: motions to dismiss chapter 7 cases based upon an alleged abuse of the bankruptcy process, pursuant to § 707(b), see In re Zaporski, 366 B.R. 758, 2007 WL 1186032 (Bankr. E.D.Mich. Apr.17, 2007), and objections to confirmation in chapter 13 cases where the question is whether contributions or loan repayments to a qualified 401(k) retirement account, an ERISA-qualified savings plan, or a deferred compensation plan, are properly included in calculating disposable income, under § 1325(b)(2), see, e.g., In re Puetz, 370 B.R. 386, 2007 WL 1805482 (Bankr.D.Kan. June 22, 2007); In re Nowlin, 366 B.R. 670 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.2007); In, re Braulick, 360 B.R. 327 (Bankr.D.Mont. 2006); In re Devilliers, 358 B.R. 849 (Bankr.E.D.La.2007); In re Njuguna, 357 B.R. 689 (Bankr.D.N.H.2006); In re Thompson, 350 B.R. 770 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio 2006); In re McBride, 347 B.R. 585 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.2006). Since § 541(b)(7) treats contributions and loan repayments to qualified 401(k) retirement accounts, ERISA-qualified savings plans, and deferred compensation plans in the same way as 403(b) plans, those cases are instructive in analyzing the issue presented here, particularly since a "403(b) plan is analogous to a 401(k) plan, but is for employees of nonprofit organizations." In re Heffernan, 242 B.R. 812, 818 n. 2 (Bankr.D.Conn. 1999). As the Heffernan Court found, "references in the discussion to 401(k) plans, therefore, are equally relevant to 403(b) plans." Id.

These cases speak with one voice in concluding that, pursuant to § 541(b)(7), 401(k) or ERISA-qualified savings plan funds are not property of the bankruptcy estate. See In re Puetz, 370 B.R. 386, 624*624 2007 WL 1805482 at * 6 ("Further, § 541(b)(7) excepts from property of the estate any amount contributed to a qualified retirement plan, to the extent legally permitted."); In re Nowlin, 366 B.R. 670, at 675, 2007 WL 1095449 at * 4 ("Under 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(7), amounts given to ERISA qualified employee benefit plans (EBPs) do not constitute property of the estate."); In re Braulick, 360 B.R. at 331 ("This Court concludes that 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(7) excludes from the property of the estate any amounts withheld by the employer or paid by the employee for a deferred compensation plan that qualifies under 26 U.S.C. § 457 prior to the remission of such amounts to the deferred compensation fund . . ."); In re Devilliers, 358 B.R. at 864 ("Thus, mandatory or voluntary contributions to qualified retirement plans are not property of the estate . . ."); In re Njuguna, 357 B.R. at 690 ("Thus, property listed in section 541(b) does not become part of the bankruptcy estate. Section 541(b)(7) lists 401k contributions. Thus, 401(k) contributions are not property of the bankruptcy estate."); In re Thompson, 350 B.R. at 775 ("A 401(k) plan is owned by the debtor, even though the plan funds are not property of the estate . . ."); In re McBride, 347 B.R. at 595 ("[t]he Debtor's after-tax contributions to her ERISA-qualified Savings Plan are excluded from the bankruptcy estate because of the presence of the anti-alienation clause.").

***********
It follows, then, that if property is excluded from the bankruptcy estate, the Court need not determine whether such property may be exempt under 12 V.S.A. § 2740(16). "Exemptions come into play only when property is included in the bankruptcy estate and is sought to be used to satisfy the claims of creditors; by definition, excluded property never forms part of the bankruptcy estate and thus need not be tested for exempt status." In re Sewell, 180 F.3d 707, 710 (5th Cir.1999) (explaining that "[a]s the Debtor in the instant case has claimed — and the bankruptcy and district courts have allowed — the exclusion of her beneficial interest in the Plan from her bankruptcy estate [means that] we never reach the issue of exemptions.") (emphasis in original). Consequently, 625*625 the Trustee's contention that the Debtors failed to exempt the contributions made to Mrs. Leahy's 403(b) account within the year prior to filing (doc. # 79) fails because the contributions were never part of the bankruptcy estate in the first instance.

• In re Mitchell

Bankr.E.D.Va. - 2007 WL 1075195 - 2007-04-04 - 13 , Above

Debtor was unable to exempt her homestead because she did not properly claim a homestead exemption for the property. The court ruled that it was not enough to merely claim an exemption in the amount of the property's value -- the debtor had to claim the homestead itself.

• Cheeseman v. Nachman

4th Cir. - 656 F.2d 60 - 1981-07-30 - ,

Main Case on Doubling of Exemptions:
married couple filing a joint petition was entitled to double the Virginia homestead exemption

• In re Williamson

Bankr.10thCir - 20 CBN 312 - - ,

• Baker v. Tardif

11th Cir - __F.3d __ - - ,

• In re Hickmott

Bankr. E.D. Mich. - 20 CBN 30 - - 7 ,

Court sustained the trustee's objection to debtor's homestead exemption, because debtor had moved out voluntarily without an intention to return. Because of debtor's actions, she could not prove that she constructively occupied the property.

• In re Camp 396 B.R. 194

9/25/2008 - W.D.TX - - ,

Like Fernandez, but with a different result. Found that if a person was forced to take another state's exemption, if can apply to property outside that state, even if the state law, only applies to property within the state.

• In re Benn

8th Cir. - 491 F.3d 811; 814 - - ,

Missouri opt out law requires the word "exempt" to appear in a statute for it to be a valid exemption in bankruptcy. As such, laws that only restrict "garnishment or attachment" may not qualify as exemptions.

• In re Smith

Bankr.W.D. Mo. 2010 - 10-60388 - - ,

the debtor claimed as exempt his interest in a pension plan pursuant to §169.090 of the Missouri Statutes. That statute provides, in part, that "[n]either the funds belonging to the retirement system nor any benefit accrued or accruing ... shall be subject to execution, garnishment, attachment or any other process whatsoever...." The trustee objected on the grounds that this statute was not an exemption statute for bankruptcy purposes as defined in the Benn decision. The Smith court agreed, emphasizing the distinction made by the Eighth Circuit in Benn between the words "not subject to attachment and execution" and "exempt from attachment and execution." Simply put, in order to create an exemption for debtors in bankruptcy, the Missouri legislature must use that word. Id.

All Cases A to Z

• Baker v. Tardif, __F.3d __ , (11th Cir ) , #
• CFCU Community Credit Union v. Hayward (In re Hayward), 552 F.3d 253 , (2d Cir. ) 2009-01-09, #4417041594903747877
• Cheeseman v. Nachman, 656 F.2d 60 , (4th Cir. ) 1981-07-30, #5616266729019662655
• Danduran v. Kaler, 438 B.R. 658 , (B.A.P. 8th Cir. ) 2010-11-04, #5993255499595116210
• In re Archer, 416 B.R. 900 , (Bankr. S.D. Fla. ) 2009-10-02, #17969756005110472609
• In re Benn, 491 F.3d 811; 814 , (8th Cir. ) , #
• In re Bourguignon, 416 BR 745 , (Bankr. D.Idaho ) 2009-09-23, #8368710255968795005
• In re Bryan, No. 10-40330-drd7 , (Bankr. W.D. Missouri ) 2011-09-02, #16642422946464857744
• In re Burgio, 441 B.R. 218 , (Bankr W.D.N.Y ) 2010-12-23, #13494023209669328528
• In re Camp 396 B.R. 194, W.D.TX , (9/25/2008 ) , #16604610768803338154
• In re Campbell, No. 09-20020-DRD-7 , (Bankr.W.D.Mo. ) 2009-08-25, #8506353293169579761
• In re Chilton, 426 B.R. 612 , (Bankr. E.D.Tex. ) 2010-03-05, #11532824026961272342
• In re Connor, 419 B.R. 304 , (Bankr.E.D.N.C. ) 2009-11-19, #6913538576031997607
• In re Cook, 406 B.R. 770 , (Bankr. S.D.Ohio ) 2009-02-04, #9803003357306555016
• In re Coulter, No. 09-50458 RFH , (Bankr. M.D.Ga. ) 2010-02-25, #2047734140653627444
• In re Daley, 459 B.R. 270 , (Bankr.E.D.Tenn ) 2011-10-11, #2973389129651509936
• In re Fadhli, No. 08-36892-H3-7 , (Bankr.S.D.Tex. ) 2009-08-10, #9570878026891302205
• In re Fernandez, 445 B.R. 790 , (W.D.TX ) 2011-01-26, #2002557109381895429
• In re Fink, No. 07-36827-H3-7 , (Bankr. S.D. Tex. ) 2009-09-17, #1882045841426168246
• In re Forshee, 09-42007 , (Bankr. D. Idaho ) 2010-09-16, #12012962501343996775
• In re Gebhart, 621 F.3d 1206 , (9th Cir. ) 2010-09-14, #7233468493640689490
• In re Gosnick, 400 B.R. 582 , (Bankr. W.D.Mich. ) 2008-12-17, #17646607654378203518
• In re Greene, 583 B.R. 614 , (9th Cir ) 2009-10-02, #11629625701243128450
• In re Grimmett, No. 09-40642-JDP , (Bankr. D.Idaho ) 2010-03-24, #4073883230895990325
• In re Hall, BAP No. KS-08-088 , (Bankr. 10th Cir. ) 2009-12-04, #8521088038930315432
• In re Hecker, 414 B.R. 499 , (Bankr. D.Minn. ) 2009-05-19, #762872915623613333
• In re Henderson, 423 BR 598 , (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. ) 2009-05-27, #8784409880879246823
• In re Hickmott, 20 CBN 30 , (Bankr. E.D. Mich. ) , #
• In re Holland, No. 05-58959 , (Bankr.N.D.Illinois ) 2009-09-03, #9382330152590331049
• In re Hurd, 441 BR 116 , (Bankr. Appellate Panel 8th Circuit ) 2010-12-15, #16827495212713769538
• In re Jackson, 593 F.3d 171 , (2nd Cir ) 2010-01-22, #2581136637540251523
• In re Leahy, 70 BR 620 , (Bankr.D.Vt. ) 2007-07-03, #2787829646009534685
• In re Lowery, , (Bankr. N.D.Ga. ) 2007-09-24, #
• In re Magee, 444 BR 254 , (Banrk.S.D.N.Y. ) 2011-02-03, #1577104955822320915
• In re Marcus, Case No. 08-81050-WRS , (Bankr. M.D.Ala. ) 2009-02-04, #1439497762856105587
• In re Martinez, 392 B.R. 530 , (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. ) 2008-08-18, #14934228554115068510
• In re McComber, 422 B.R. 334 , (D.Mass ) 2010-01-12, #11032182230723271992
• In re McLaughlin, No. 09-44714-JBR , (Bankr. D.Mass. ) 2010-03-18, #12152042649462068166
• In re Miller, No. 1:09-bk-03336-MDF , (Bankr. M.D.Pa. ) 2010-02-05, #18086405866439265837
• In re Mitchell, 2007 WL 1075195 , (Bankr.E.D.Va. ) 2007-04-04, #
• In re Murphy, 434 BR 67 , (Bankr. EW.D.NY ) 2010-07-14, #197471297699110389
• In re Nguyen and Trinh, Case No. 11-14125-BFK , (Bankr.ED VA ) 2011-09-02, #18148075939563729832
• In re Norra, 421 B.R. 782 , (Bankr. S.D Texas ) 2009-11-05, #6728215235494998472
• In re Olson, 424 B.R. 770 , (Bankr. E.D.Mich. ) 2010-03-01, #3837573312146424175
• In re Ramirez, 413 B.R. 621 , (Bankr.S.D.Texas ) 2009-06-24, #10100511763189315308
• In re Rodrigues, Case No. 09-11960-JNF , (Bankr. D.Mass. ) 2010-02-23, #18111593207622205142
• In re Scannell, 453 B.R. 36 , (Bankr.D.N.H ) 2011-07-26, #12052989234543622753
• In re Shumac, 425 B.R. 139 , (Bankr.M.D.Pa. ) 2010-03-04, #12424550928914213278
• In re Smith, 10-60388 , (Bankr.W.D. Mo. 2010 ) , #
• In re Sparks, Case No. 09-30238-H3-7 , (Bankr.S.D.Texas ) 2009-08-31, #9076080556986626107
• In re Walck, 459 B.R. 208 , (Bankr.M.D.Pa ) 2011-10-11, #639163923309803164
• In re Williamson, 20 CBN 312 , (Bankr.10thCir ) , #
• Jackson v. Novak (In re Jackson), 593 F.3d 171 , (2nd Cir. Conn. ) 2010-01-22, #2581136637540251523
• Russell v. Healthmont of Missouri LLC, 348 SW 3d 784 , (Mo: Court of Appeals W.D. ) 2011-08-23, #6859016267663803756