Keywords: Projected disposable income . Chapter 13 . Form 22C . Hamilton v Lanning . Lanning .
Creditor argues confirmation of the Debtors' second amended plan must be denied because the Debtors are not proposing to step up their plan payments to account for the additional projected disposable income they will have available as their vehicle loans are paid off during the life of their plan.
Future events simply do not mesh with the backward glance required by § 1325(b)(1)(B) at confirmation. Thus, the apparent liberation of debtor monies by the proposed retirement of automotive loans during the life of a plan is not an impediment to confirmation for purposes of § 1325(b)(1)(B).[6] As the Debtors' second amended plan provides for monthly plan payments of $250 for a period of 60 months, the court finds that the Debtors have satisfied § 1325(b)(1)(B).
Chapter 13 > Projected Disposable Income Chapter 13: How is "Projected Disposable Income" Calculated for Above Median Income Debtors90 Cases , IssueID 8 |
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Ch 7 Means Test |
Ch 13 Means Test |
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Topic Description:U.S. Supreme court finally resolves this question choosing to follow the line of cases started by In re Nowlin (type C) in this outline. Lines of Cases:
Topic Background / Overview:Before the 2005 bankruptcy law amendments (BAPCPA), the trustee and judge used Form 6, Schedule I (income) and Form 6, Schedule J (expenses) to determine a debtor's likelehood of succeeding in a chapter 13 plan. |
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U.S. Supreme court finally resolves this question choosing to follow the line of cases started by In re Nowlin (type C) in this outline.
Held: When a bankruptcy court calculates a debtor's projected disposable income, the court may account for changes in the debtor's income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation.
Throughout its discussion the court seemed to agree with the "Type C" cases listed here that use form 22C as the standard for what expenses are and are not allowed, but these amounts can be adjusted if changes in the debtor's income or expenses "are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation." Note that's a pretty high bar.
Note also that the court says you should keep the formula from Form 22C but adjust it based on facts. It does not say to throw out 22C and rely on Schedules I and J.
The court found that refinancing a purchase money loan did not change its purchase money status, and that the negative equity was not included in the creditor's PMSI. The court applied "'the dual status rule,' which recognizes that the secured obligation in the newly acquired vehicle may be fractionalized, with one part being secured by a purchase money security interest and another part secured by a standard security interest."
All but dismisses Kavengeama as "dicta"
Calls Kavengeama mostly 'Dicta"
Ninth Circuit case that runs counter to many in holding that Chapter 13 projected income is a automatic muliplier of 6-month CMI at time of filing.
The debtors earned above median income for their applicable family size in Wisconsin during the six months before filing. However, they have experienced a significant drop in income, and their disposable income will be calculated based on their ability to pay over their proposed 60 month plan. See In re Hilton, 395 B.R. 433 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.2008).
court refused to confirm plan "because, at [that] time, there [was] insufficient evidence to calculate [the debtors'] anticipated or projected disposable income" and required the debtors to "present specific evidence to show that the numbers reflected on form [B]22C are inaccurate projections of their future finances"
Court must look forward. Debtor failed to properly amortize court-ordered support payments that were due to expire on the 24th month of his plan. Debtor required to amortize court ordered payments
over a 60 month period. Section 707(b)(2)(A)(iv)
Legislative history indicates that Congress intended for the Local Standards to function as fixed deduction amounts. In re Fowler, 349 B.R. at 418. Congress added § 707(b)(2) to the Bankruptcy Code in 2005 as part of BAPCPA. In re Burbank, 401 B.R. 67, 70 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2009). In an earlier version of BAPCPA that did not pass, Congress had defined "projected monthly net income" for the means test to require the following calculation of expenses:
(A) the expense allowances under the applicable National Standards, Local Standards, and Other Necessary Expenses allowance (excluding payments for debts) for the debtor . . . in the area in which the debtor resides as determined under the Internal Revenue Service financial analysis for expenses in effect as of the date of the order for relief.
In re Fowler, 349 B.R. at 418 (quoting H.R. 3150, 105th Congress (1998) (emphasis added by Fowler court)). In the enacted version of BAPCPA, Congress replaced the reference to the IRS financial analysis with the "applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the National and Local Standards" language. Id. This language change demonstrates that Congress' purpose in referring to the Local Standards was to establish a fixed deduction rather than to make IRS financial analysis binding on bankruptcy courts. Id.[16] Indeed, in this respect, the legislative history could not have been clearer: "`The bill also makes substantial changes to chapter 13 by substituting the IRS expense standards to calculate disposable income. . . . The formula remains inflexible and divorced from the debtor's actual circumstances.'" In re Swan, 368 B.R. at 20 (quoting Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, to Accompany S. 256, H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1 at 553 (2005)).
§1322(e) requires debtors to include fees and costs as part of mortgage arrearage claim even if mortgage is undersecured.
Debtor brought a motion to excuse filing of schedule I and to set an alternative date for calculating current monthly income. Court agreed:
"11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) defines "current monthly income" as the average monthly income from all sources that the debtor receives, derived during a six month period ending on either: (i) the last day of the calendar month preceding the petition date if the debtor files a schedule of current income, or (ii) the date on which the court determines current income "for purposes of this title" if the debtor does not file a schedule of current income. 11 U.S.C. § 521 (a) states that the debtor shall file a schedule of current income and expenditures unless the court orders otherwise. Read together, these provisions potentially allow a debtor to not file a schedule of current income (otherwise known as Schedule I) and derive CMI from a time period determined by the court. A debtor normally pursues this option when the CMI determined from the six month period preceding the petition date does not provide an accurate reflection of the debtor's current income. In re Dunford, 408 B.R. 489, 493 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009)."
absent evidence of a change in circumstances, court will not adjust "projected disposable income" simply because payments seen beyond debtors' reasonable needs
The court ruled that debtors get a full standard vehicle deduction, and that the court should treat the full-vehicle deduction as the presumptive vehicle ownership cost.
The court rejected the holding in In re Strickland (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2001), that a debtor's use of the vehicle ownership deduction is inconsistent with the forward-looking nature of projected disposable income used to determine the adequacy of a Chapter 13 plan.
Court held that the standards of the means test should be applied in determining what expenses are allowed or not, while still allowing the court to look at changed circumstances -- as long as the standards applied don't change.
The Bankruptcy Code already provides an alternative for debtors who have special circumstances that justify additional expenses under section 707(b)(2)(B), see In re Kolb, 366 B.R. at 805, 817 n. 21; Lundin § 467.1 at ¶ 35, or whose income going forward is less than otherwise suggested by the debtor's historical earnings during the six months preceding the bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(A)(ii); In re Dunford, 408 B.R. 489 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 2009) (granting debtor's request to use different end date to calculate "current monthly income" pursuant to express language of section 101(10A)(A)(ii))
When the reduction in income occurs before filing, debtors can avoid the problem of their actual disposable income being lower than their "projected disposable income" by not filing Schedule I. In Dunford, the debtor's income had dropped sharply about a month before she filed under Chapter 13, and the debtor did not have enough income to fund her plan if she had calculated her "current monthly income" using the normal six calendar months before filing provided under section 101(10A)(A)(i). See Dunford, 408 B.R. at 491. The problem was alleviated when the debtor used a revised six month period (three-months pre-bankruptcy and three months post-bankruptcy) to calculate her "current monthly income" and, in turn, her "disposable income," under the express provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. See 408 B.R. at 491.
reaffirming decision in Frederickson
The bankruptcy court apparently believed that it could not consider that Lasowski's 401(k) loan payments would cease during the term of her plan, because to do so would conflict with § 1322(f), which provides that "[a] plan may not materially alter the terms of a loan" from a 401(k) or other specified retirement plan. See Lasowski, 375 B.R. at 530; see also In re Haley, 354 B.R. 340, 344 (Bankr.D.N.H. 2006); In re Wiggs, No. 06-70203, 2006 WL 2246432, at *3 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. Aug. 4, 2006) (unpublished). We disagree with this conclusion, because the calculations of disposable income and projected disposable income do not alter the terms of the 401(k) loan. See Spalding v. Truman, No. 08-064, 2008 WL 4566459, at *3 (N.D.Tex. Oct. 14, 2008); In re Novak, 379 B.R. 908, 911 (Bankr.D.Neb.2007); see also 6 Keith M. Lundin, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy § 491.1, at 491-4 (3d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2006). These calculations simply determine the total amount that Lasowski must distribute to her unsecured creditors over the course of her plan. See Novak, 379 B.R. at 911. Interpreting "projected disposable income" to recognize the reasonably certain future termination of loan repayments does not require Lasowski to propose a plan that changes the terms of her 401(k) loans. Nor does it deprive her of sufficient funds to repay the loans, for she is free to propose a tiered plan that increases payments to unsecured creditors after the 401(k) payments have ceased.
totality of circumstances support granting debtors motion to be excused from filing Schedule I, and reset the applicable six month period for calculating current monthly income.
adjust for reasonably certain changes
ORDER EXCUSING DEBTORS FROM FILING REQUIRED SCHEDULE "I" AND SETTING ALTERNATIVE DATE FOR DETERMINING CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME
Debtor brought a motion to excuse filing of schedule I and to set an alternative date for calculating current monthly income. Court agreed.
When the disposable income calculation leads to a result that is seriously distorted, this court believes it is proper to take the distortion into account in determining projected disposable incomewhich is to say, the court would not treat projection as a simple straight-line extrapolation of disposable income as calculated by the means test. At the same timemindful of what appears to be Congress's intent to achieve uniformity and predictability by substituting an objective for a subjective testthe court does not believe that the disposable income figure as calculated by the means test should be adjusted except for the most weighty considerations.
The end result is a synthesis of §§ 101(10A) and 1325(b) that measures the "current monthly income" inclusions and exclusions of § 101(10A) projected to be received by the debtor during the applicable commitment period defined by § 1325(b), reduced by the necessary expenditures incurred by the debtor during that period
"A debtor must supplement Official Form 22C with a statement of changes to 'current monthly income' as reported in the form, and any changes in the expenses allowed, anticipated to take place during the applicable commitment period."
Petition for cert granted. Pending in Supreme Court. to be decided this year. -
Unusual case in that debtor would benefit from NOT using CMI multiplier. In this case, her changed circumstance was lower wages. In most cases, debtor's attorneys hope to lock in lower wages using CMI. This case presents a reverse fact pattern, where using a CMI mulitplier woulld hurt the debtor. (Debtor should have just waited longer to file so her six-month lookback would not include a one time bounus distributed in the fith and sixth months prior to her bankruptcy filing. Court said her lower income going forward should be taken into account in determining the "projected disposable income" for Chapter 13 plan, and that means test CMI can be rebutted for purposes of establishing projected income going forward..
"projected disposable income" is presumed to be the number calculated on a debtor's Form B22C. If a debtor, unsecured creditor or trustee can rebut that presumption, the court will consider all of the relevant facts and circumstances necessary to calculate the projected disposable income that the debtor expects to receive during the applicable commitment period.
an above-median debtor who has no disposable income according to Form 22C can propose a confirmable plan with a length of less than five years if the other statutory requirements are met (cert. denied, Frederickson v. Coop, 129 S. Ct. 1630 (2009)(starting point)
Congress, in its amendments to § 1325(b), also sought to impose objective standards on Chapter 13 determinations, thereby removing a degree of judicial flexibility in bankruptcy proceedings.
"The primary issue is whether the amount of 401(k) loan payments that are completed before the chapter 13 plan term ends must be added, for confirmation purposes, to the disposable income to be paid under the terms of the plan."
Held: "The completion of payments to the 401(k) plan does not simply free that money for discretionary application but should shift to creditors, at least in significant part, and result in repayment of the people Debtor owes. To propose nothing further to them, especially with an initial one percent dividend, is not a good faith effort."
Creditor argues confirmation of the Debtors' second amended plan must be denied because the Debtors are not proposing to step up their plan payments to account for the additional projected disposable income they will have available as their vehicle loans are paid off during the life of their plan.
Future events simply do not mesh with the backward glance required by § 1325(b)(1)(B) at confirmation. Thus, the apparent liberation of debtor monies by the proposed retirement of automotive loans during the life of a plan is not an impediment to confirmation for purposes of § 1325(b)(1)(B).[6] As the Debtors' second amended plan provides for monthly plan payments of $250 for a period of 60 months, the court finds that the Debtors have satisfied § 1325(b)(1)(B).
The "special circumstances" analysis is applicable to Chapter 13 cases as a separate defense to a Section 1325(b) objection.
projected disposable income should be calculated in strict accordance with Form B22C
The direction in § 1325(b)(3) that reasonably necessary expenditures be determined in accordance with subparagraph (B) (as well as (A)) of § 707(b)(2) means that a chapter 13 debtor may show special circumstances to adjust disposable income to the same extent and in the same manner as a chapter 7 debtor may show them to rebut the presumption of abuse.
Schedules I and J no longer determine plan payments for above-median income debtors; they do not conclusively establish net monthly income even though they may constitute the debtor's best estimates of future income and expenses
debtors are not obligated to pay more than the disposable income calculated on Form 22C
Section 1325(b)(3)'s incorporation of § 707(b)(2)(B) provides the Court with the ability to adjust both CMI and expenses. . . . Under this provision, the Court may consider a debtor's special circumstances in deviating from the formulaic determination under § 1325(b)(3).
holding that "the income component of 'projected disposable income' as set forth in § 1325(b)(1)(B) is the anticipated actual income of the Debtor," as defined by the income inclusions and exclusions of § 101(10A)
Form B22C can not be determinative of the debtor's "projected disposable income" because it does not take into account the debtor's circumstances as of the petition date or foreseeable changes in circumstances in income during the plan commitment period.
Form 22C is determinative of projected disposable income and that taxes on Form 22C should therefore be calculated based on the income earned in the six months prior to the bankruptcy filing, and not based on future income
"[e]liminating flexibility was the point: the obligations of chapter 13 debtors would be subject to 'clear, defined standards,' no longer left 'to the whim of a judicial proceeding.' "
BAPCPA prevents court from looking at anything other than the income six months prior to filing when confirming a Chapter 13 plan
Tax refund to be recieved during plan must be included as as part of projected disposable income.
holding that "projected disposable income" under § 1325(b)(1)(B) necessarily refers to income that the debtor reasonably expects to receive during the term of her plan, but that "Section 101(10A) continues to apply inasmuch as it describes the sources of revenue that constitute income, as well as those that do not
"the calculation of a debtor's projected disposable income: (a) must not include itemssuch as benefits received under the Social Security Actthat are excluded from the definition of currently monthly income set forth in § 101(10A); "
Legislative history indicates that Congress intended for the Local Standards to function as fixed deduction amounts. In re Fowler, 349 B.R. at 418. Congress added § 707(b)(2) to the Bankruptcy Code in 2005 as part of BAPCPA. In re Burbank, 401 B.R. 67, 70 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2009). In an earlier version of BAPCPA that did not pass, Congress had defined "projected monthly net income" for the means test to require the following calculation of expenses:
(A) the expense allowances under the applicable National Standards, Local Standards, and Other Necessary Expenses allowance (excluding payments for debts) for the debtor . . . in the area in which the debtor resides as determined under the Internal Revenue Service financial analysis for expenses in effect as of the date of the order for relief.
In re Fowler, 349 B.R. at 418 (quoting H.R. 3150, 105th Congress (1998) (emphasis added by Fowler court)). In the enacted version of BAPCPA, Congress replaced the reference to the IRS financial analysis with the "applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the National and Local Standards" language. Id. This language change demonstrates that Congress' purpose in referring to the Local Standards was to establish a fixed deduction rather than to make IRS financial analysis binding on bankruptcy courts. Id.[16] Indeed, in this respect, the legislative history could not have been clearer: "`The bill also makes substantial changes to chapter 13 by substituting the IRS expense standards to calculate disposable income. . . . The formula remains inflexible and divorced from the debtor's actual circumstances.'" In re Swan, 368 B.R. at 20 (quoting Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, to Accompany S. 256, H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1 at 553 (2005)).
§1322(e) requires debtors to include fees and costs as part of mortgage arrearage claim even if mortgage is undersecured.
U.S. Supreme court finally resolves this question choosing to follow the line of cases started by In re Nowlin (type C) in this outline.
Held: When a bankruptcy court calculates a debtor's projected disposable income, the court may account for changes in the debtor's income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation.
Throughout its discussion the court seemed to agree with the "Type C" cases listed here that use form 22C as the standard for what expenses are and are not allowed, but these amounts can be adjusted if changes in the debtor's income or expenses "are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation." Note that's a pretty high bar.
Note also that the court says you should keep the formula from Form 22C but adjust it based on facts. It does not say to throw out 22C and rely on Schedules I and J.
The court found that refinancing a purchase money loan did not change its purchase money status, and that the negative equity was not included in the creditor's PMSI. The court applied "'the dual status rule,' which recognizes that the secured obligation in the newly acquired vehicle may be fractionalized, with one part being secured by a purchase money security interest and another part secured by a standard security interest."
Debtor brought a motion to excuse filing of schedule I and to set an alternative date for calculating current monthly income. Court agreed:
"11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) defines "current monthly income" as the average monthly income from all sources that the debtor receives, derived during a six month period ending on either: (i) the last day of the calendar month preceding the petition date if the debtor files a schedule of current income, or (ii) the date on which the court determines current income "for purposes of this title" if the debtor does not file a schedule of current income. 11 U.S.C. § 521 (a) states that the debtor shall file a schedule of current income and expenditures unless the court orders otherwise. Read together, these provisions potentially allow a debtor to not file a schedule of current income (otherwise known as Schedule I) and derive CMI from a time period determined by the court. A debtor normally pursues this option when the CMI determined from the six month period preceding the petition date does not provide an accurate reflection of the debtor's current income. In re Dunford, 408 B.R. 489, 493 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009)."
absent evidence of a change in circumstances, court will not adjust "projected disposable income" simply because payments seen beyond debtors' reasonable needs
All but dismisses Kavengeama as "dicta"
Calls Kavengeama mostly 'Dicta"
The court ruled that debtors get a full standard vehicle deduction, and that the court should treat the full-vehicle deduction as the presumptive vehicle ownership cost.
The court rejected the holding in In re Strickland (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2001), that a debtor's use of the vehicle ownership deduction is inconsistent with the forward-looking nature of projected disposable income used to determine the adequacy of a Chapter 13 plan.
Court held that the standards of the means test should be applied in determining what expenses are allowed or not, while still allowing the court to look at changed circumstances -- as long as the standards applied don't change.
The Bankruptcy Code already provides an alternative for debtors who have special circumstances that justify additional expenses under section 707(b)(2)(B), see In re Kolb, 366 B.R. at 805, 817 n. 21; Lundin § 467.1 at ¶ 35, or whose income going forward is less than otherwise suggested by the debtor's historical earnings during the six months preceding the bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(A)(ii); In re Dunford, 408 B.R. 489 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 2009) (granting debtor's request to use different end date to calculate "current monthly income" pursuant to express language of section 101(10A)(A)(ii))
When the reduction in income occurs before filing, debtors can avoid the problem of their actual disposable income being lower than their "projected disposable income" by not filing Schedule I. In Dunford, the debtor's income had dropped sharply about a month before she filed under Chapter 13, and the debtor did not have enough income to fund her plan if she had calculated her "current monthly income" using the normal six calendar months before filing provided under section 101(10A)(A)(i). See Dunford, 408 B.R. at 491. The problem was alleviated when the debtor used a revised six month period (three-months pre-bankruptcy and three months post-bankruptcy) to calculate her "current monthly income" and, in turn, her "disposable income," under the express provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. See 408 B.R. at 491.
reaffirming decision in Frederickson
The bankruptcy court apparently believed that it could not consider that Lasowski's 401(k) loan payments would cease during the term of her plan, because to do so would conflict with § 1322(f), which provides that "[a] plan may not materially alter the terms of a loan" from a 401(k) or other specified retirement plan. See Lasowski, 375 B.R. at 530; see also In re Haley, 354 B.R. 340, 344 (Bankr.D.N.H. 2006); In re Wiggs, No. 06-70203, 2006 WL 2246432, at *3 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. Aug. 4, 2006) (unpublished). We disagree with this conclusion, because the calculations of disposable income and projected disposable income do not alter the terms of the 401(k) loan. See Spalding v. Truman, No. 08-064, 2008 WL 4566459, at *3 (N.D.Tex. Oct. 14, 2008); In re Novak, 379 B.R. 908, 911 (Bankr.D.Neb.2007); see also 6 Keith M. Lundin, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy § 491.1, at 491-4 (3d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2006). These calculations simply determine the total amount that Lasowski must distribute to her unsecured creditors over the course of her plan. See Novak, 379 B.R. at 911. Interpreting "projected disposable income" to recognize the reasonably certain future termination of loan repayments does not require Lasowski to propose a plan that changes the terms of her 401(k) loans. Nor does it deprive her of sufficient funds to repay the loans, for she is free to propose a tiered plan that increases payments to unsecured creditors after the 401(k) payments have ceased.
totality of circumstances support granting debtors motion to be excused from filing Schedule I, and reset the applicable six month period for calculating current monthly income.
adjust for reasonably certain changes
ORDER EXCUSING DEBTORS FROM FILING REQUIRED SCHEDULE "I" AND SETTING ALTERNATIVE DATE FOR DETERMINING CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME
Debtor brought a motion to excuse filing of schedule I and to set an alternative date for calculating current monthly income. Court agreed.
When the disposable income calculation leads to a result that is seriously distorted, this court believes it is proper to take the distortion into account in determining projected disposable incomewhich is to say, the court would not treat projection as a simple straight-line extrapolation of disposable income as calculated by the means test. At the same timemindful of what appears to be Congress's intent to achieve uniformity and predictability by substituting an objective for a subjective testthe court does not believe that the disposable income figure as calculated by the means test should be adjusted except for the most weighty considerations.
The end result is a synthesis of §§ 101(10A) and 1325(b) that measures the "current monthly income" inclusions and exclusions of § 101(10A) projected to be received by the debtor during the applicable commitment period defined by § 1325(b), reduced by the necessary expenditures incurred by the debtor during that period
"A debtor must supplement Official Form 22C with a statement of changes to 'current monthly income' as reported in the form, and any changes in the expenses allowed, anticipated to take place during the applicable commitment period."
Petition for cert granted. Pending in Supreme Court. to be decided this year. -
Unusual case in that debtor would benefit from NOT using CMI multiplier. In this case, her changed circumstance was lower wages. In most cases, debtor's attorneys hope to lock in lower wages using CMI. This case presents a reverse fact pattern, where using a CMI mulitplier woulld hurt the debtor. (Debtor should have just waited longer to file so her six-month lookback would not include a one time bounus distributed in the fith and sixth months prior to her bankruptcy filing. Court said her lower income going forward should be taken into account in determining the "projected disposable income" for Chapter 13 plan, and that means test CMI can be rebutted for purposes of establishing projected income going forward..
"projected disposable income" is presumed to be the number calculated on a debtor's Form B22C. If a debtor, unsecured creditor or trustee can rebut that presumption, the court will consider all of the relevant facts and circumstances necessary to calculate the projected disposable income that the debtor expects to receive during the applicable commitment period.
an above-median debtor who has no disposable income according to Form 22C can propose a confirmable plan with a length of less than five years if the other statutory requirements are met (cert. denied, Frederickson v. Coop, 129 S. Ct. 1630 (2009)(starting point)
Congress, in its amendments to § 1325(b), also sought to impose objective standards on Chapter 13 determinations, thereby removing a degree of judicial flexibility in bankruptcy proceedings.
Ninth Circuit case that runs counter to many in holding that Chapter 13 projected income is a automatic muliplier of 6-month CMI at time of filing.
"The primary issue is whether the amount of 401(k) loan payments that are completed before the chapter 13 plan term ends must be added, for confirmation purposes, to the disposable income to be paid under the terms of the plan."
Held: "The completion of payments to the 401(k) plan does not simply free that money for discretionary application but should shift to creditors, at least in significant part, and result in repayment of the people Debtor owes. To propose nothing further to them, especially with an initial one percent dividend, is not a good faith effort."
Creditor argues confirmation of the Debtors' second amended plan must be denied because the Debtors are not proposing to step up their plan payments to account for the additional projected disposable income they will have available as their vehicle loans are paid off during the life of their plan.
Future events simply do not mesh with the backward glance required by § 1325(b)(1)(B) at confirmation. Thus, the apparent liberation of debtor monies by the proposed retirement of automotive loans during the life of a plan is not an impediment to confirmation for purposes of § 1325(b)(1)(B).[6] As the Debtors' second amended plan provides for monthly plan payments of $250 for a period of 60 months, the court finds that the Debtors have satisfied § 1325(b)(1)(B).
The "special circumstances" analysis is applicable to Chapter 13 cases as a separate defense to a Section 1325(b) objection.
projected disposable income should be calculated in strict accordance with Form B22C
The direction in § 1325(b)(3) that reasonably necessary expenditures be determined in accordance with subparagraph (B) (as well as (A)) of § 707(b)(2) means that a chapter 13 debtor may show special circumstances to adjust disposable income to the same extent and in the same manner as a chapter 7 debtor may show them to rebut the presumption of abuse.
Schedules I and J no longer determine plan payments for above-median income debtors; they do not conclusively establish net monthly income even though they may constitute the debtor's best estimates of future income and expenses
debtors are not obligated to pay more than the disposable income calculated on Form 22C
Section 1325(b)(3)'s incorporation of § 707(b)(2)(B) provides the Court with the ability to adjust both CMI and expenses. . . . Under this provision, the Court may consider a debtor's special circumstances in deviating from the formulaic determination under § 1325(b)(3).
holding that "the income component of 'projected disposable income' as set forth in § 1325(b)(1)(B) is the anticipated actual income of the Debtor," as defined by the income inclusions and exclusions of § 101(10A)
Form B22C can not be determinative of the debtor's "projected disposable income" because it does not take into account the debtor's circumstances as of the petition date or foreseeable changes in circumstances in income during the plan commitment period.
Form 22C is determinative of projected disposable income and that taxes on Form 22C should therefore be calculated based on the income earned in the six months prior to the bankruptcy filing, and not based on future income
The debtors earned above median income for their applicable family size in Wisconsin during the six months before filing. However, they have experienced a significant drop in income, and their disposable income will be calculated based on their ability to pay over their proposed 60 month plan. See In re Hilton, 395 B.R. 433 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.2008).
court refused to confirm plan "because, at [that] time, there [was] insufficient evidence to calculate [the debtors'] anticipated or projected disposable income" and required the debtors to "present specific evidence to show that the numbers reflected on form [B]22C are inaccurate projections of their future finances"
Court must look forward. Debtor failed to properly amortize court-ordered support payments that were due to expire on the 24th month of his plan. Debtor required to amortize court ordered payments
over a 60 month period. Section 707(b)(2)(A)(iv)
"[e]liminating flexibility was the point: the obligations of chapter 13 debtors would be subject to 'clear, defined standards,' no longer left 'to the whim of a judicial proceeding.' "
BAPCPA prevents court from looking at anything other than the income six months prior to filing when confirming a Chapter 13 plan
Tax refund to be recieved during plan must be included as as part of projected disposable income.
holding that "projected disposable income" under § 1325(b)(1)(B) necessarily refers to income that the debtor reasonably expects to receive during the term of her plan, but that "Section 101(10A) continues to apply inasmuch as it describes the sources of revenue that constitute income, as well as those that do not
All Cases A to Z
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