Keywords: exemptions .
Exemptions > Homestead Exemptions: Miscellaneous Cases58 Cases , IssueID 37 |
||||||||||||
Topic Description:A collection of various cases on a variety of exemption issues in various states, and federal limits on exemptions. Lines of Cases:
|
||||||||||||
Utah Debtor allowed to claim Idaho homestead rights despite postpeition statements that she never intended to reside there (with her estranged husband who intended to divorce her.
Exemption amount is fixed at time of filing. Post-petition appreciation goes to trustee. Exemption amount is fixed at the time of filing. Trustee can claim non-exempt equity even after discharge, but before the case is closed. A Chapter 7 debtor will not be certain about the status of a homestead property until the case is closed (something that may not happen for several years after bankruptcy filing) or the trustee abandons the property.
"What is frozen as of the date of filing the petition is the value of the debtor's exemption, not the fair market value of the property claimed as exempt. See Hyman v. Plotkin (In re Hyman), 967 F. 2d 1316, 1320 n.9 (9th Cir. 1992). A number of our cases have held that, under the California exemption scheme, the estate is entitled to postpetition appreciation in the value of property a portion of which is otherwise exempt. See Alsberg v. Robertson (In re Alsberg), 68 F.3d 312, 314-15 (9th Cir. 1995); Hyman, 967 F.2d at 1321; Schwaber v. Reed (In re Reed), 940 F.2d 1317, 1323 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Viet Vu v. Kendall (In re Viet Vu), 245 B.R. 644, 647-48 (9th Cir. BAP 2000).
.....
The debtors argue that the result we reach today will lead to uncertainty about the status of exempt property and abuses by trustees. The facts of the Gebhart bankruptcy suggest that some of these concerns are legitimate. Gebhart remained in his home for five years after filing for bankruptcy, paying his mortgage and believing that his bankruptcy was finished when he received his discharge. Gebhart may have been mistaken in this belief, but his misapprehension was shared by his mortgage lender, which refinanced his home, apparently unaware of any claims on the property by the Trustee. A Chapter 7 debtor will not be certain about the status of a homestead property until the case is closed (something that may not happen for several years after bankruptcy filing) or the trustee abandons the property."
The court ruled that debtor's right to receive alimony payments from ex-husband were exempt.
Section 522(p) homestead limitation's 1215 day period runs from date of ownership of the property, not from the date of declaration of homestead.
Money that debtors deposited into a college savings account several days prior to filing for Chapter 7 relief was held as non-exempt property of the bankruptcy estate.
The court said, "Debtors' lack of ability to direct the investments or the funds in the College Account is not a sufficient restriction for Section 541(c)(2) purposes."
Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) are property of the state and are not exempt. under federal exemptions
(Debtor argued account exempt under 522(d(10)(C) or (11)(D))
Few states have exemption for HSAs
If no wildcard available, only practical solution may be to withdraw the funds and pay the tax penalty.
Reaffirming In Re Benn as controlling law when it comes to Missouri Exemptions. Exemptions must be statutory in Missouri under its opt-out law.
$100,000 insuramce proceeds fully exempt as necessary for support for low income debtor with only a few more years till retirement. Federal exeption used. 522(d)(1)(C)
Debtor's IRA with Merrill Lynch was not exempt due to language in a standard Client Relationship Agreement which gave Merrill a Lien on all IRA funds used for Margin or borrowing. Debtor never did either, but the clause itself was enough to render the IRA not exempt, according to the judge.
When a state opts out of federal exemptions, state law determines PROCEDURE as well as substance of exemptions. In this case, they did not file their homestead deed in time required by state law (within 5 days of the 341 meeting date.
Missouri annuity statute is not an valid bankruptcy exemption because it does not contain the words "exempt" - Citing the 8th Cir ruling In re Benn, 491 F.3d 811; 814, 8th Cir., 2007
the fact that debtor did not claim full exemption on Schedule C does not prevent him from applying the full exemption in doing the lein-avoidance calculaitons under section 522(f)(2)(A)(iii).
Exemptions taken in previous Chapter 7 do not bind the current Chapter 13 proceeding where N.Y. state exemptions had substantially increased between first and second filing. Coutt ruled debtor may claim new, higher exemption amounts.
Debtor who left his Texas home to find work in Nevada for two years before returning to Texas and filing bankruptcy lost his Texas homestead exemption, and could not claim Nevada exemption either, according to this court (diverging from two other courts in the same district - In re Camp 396 B.R. 194, W.D.TX, 2008; In re Garrett, 435 B.R. 434, W.D.TX, 2010
Debtor cannot compel trustee to abandon debtpr's partially exempt car. Good explanation of procedure when you have a partial exemption and how you lose your car.
Court allowed debtor to claim as exempt $7000 deposited in bank account that held proceeds from sale of exempt homestead. Court said debtor's pre-bankruptcy exemption planning did not amount to fraud. $7000 was from sale of personal property sold when home was sold.
"In view of these principles and the Eighth Circuit's permissive approach to non-fraudulent, pre-bankruptcy planning,[9] we find the Debtor's establishment of a savings account for the specific purpose of depositing the proceeds of his homestead and his subsequent deposit into that account of the proceeds from the personal property (allegedly) sold with his homestead sufficient indicia of his intent to convert non-exempt personal property into exempt, homestead property. Because the record is devoid of any contrary evidence or evidence that the Debtor acted with fraudulent intent when he converted nonexempt property into exempt property, the Debtor is entitled to claim the entire $87,501.55 in his savings account as his homestead exemption claim."
GM vehicle voucher for employees is exempt
"the voucher is appropriately treated as partial compensation for this loss of future earnings. Accordingly, the voucher is exemptible under the New York Debtor & Creditor Law.
Section 282(3)(iv) states that compensation of loss of future earnings is exempt "to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor." In his papers, the trustee has challenged only the exemptible character of the voucher. Giving consideration only to the issue presented, the court will overrule the trustee's objection. To the extent that the trustee may wish now to make a further argument that the voucher is not reasonably necessary for the debtor's support, he may timely move for reconsideration of this decision."
Massachusetts law merely requires that a homestead claimant "occupy or intend to occupy said home as a principal residence."
Even though the debtor allegedly intended to sell his home when he recorded the homestead, the exemption was valid because the debtor met the requirement (that is, he occupied the property as his principal residence at the time that he claimed the homestead).
Inherited funds from debtor's mother's IRA account were not exempt under Section 522(d)(12).
Compensation from personal injury award was allowed as an exemption (under Section 522(d)(11)). Specifically, the court disagreed with the trustee's argument that the debtor's injury needed to be permanent in order to be exempt. The debtor's injuries caused him to miss work for three months, and still caused him pain two years after the accident were (according to the court) sufficiently severe to be exempt.
Note: the "asset" here is the right to the damages from the personal injury award.
Debtor and her spouse are co-owners of the annuity, and their children are listed as beneficiaries. Court ruled that exemption Mich. Comp. Laws Section 500.4054 did not protect annuity owners against creditor claims against the non-beneficiary owners of the annuity.
"A straightforward reading of [Mich. Comp. Laws Section 500.4054] discloses that it does not protect the insured against claims his or her creditors make on the proceeds of the insurance or annuity fund. Rather, the statute protects the insurer from claims that beneficiaries' creditors make on the proceeds of the fund. This statute does not allow Debtor, the 'insured,' to exempt her interest in the annuity."
The court did not allow debtors to exempt proceeds from a personal injury claim, because debtors intentionally and fraudulently attempted to conceal the claim.
Debtor's home placed in a Living Trust had a valid homestead exemption.
Debtor's alimony award from a divorce decree was exempt.
"Future earnings" under 522(d)(11)(E) referred only to post-petition earnings, not post-injury earnings that preceded petition.
Federal wages exemption 522(d)(11)(E) for "future earnings" only exempts wages that are postpetition and necessary for support. Here debtor claimed as exempt and entire 135K wrongful termination settlement as exempt wages. Court held that amount was exempt only to the extent that it was for postpetition earnings, and then only to the extent needed for support. Applying that standard, debtor was allowed to exempt only $16,550 of the court settlement.
Debtor could amend filing to switch from Federal to state homestead exemption (over objection of Trustee), but was limited by MA homestead law to the applying the homestead only to parcel that was described in the declaration of homestead, which did not include his adjoining parcel.
Debtors may assert homestead exemption in property the own but don't live in, provided that family lives in the property.
Wife forced to take federal exemptions, husband forced to take state exemptions.
Entire moblile home park was debtor's homestead.
Debtors declined to use a homestead exemption (deciding to reaffirm their mortgage instead), and the court held that they could not then use a wild card exemption meant for debtors without ability to claim a homestead exemption. The court reasoned that "In the context of Fla.Stat. Section 222.25(4) [the wild card exemption statute], the phrase 'receive the benefits of'... refers to the legal right or advantage the Florida Constitution confers upon a homestead owner, regardless of whether the owner actually relies on the privilege."
Court allowed debtor to take a "head of family" exemption even though he was living apart from his wife at the time, because he was still financially supporting his family.
Applying and explaining Florida Tenancy by the Entireties exemption to a case in Illinois allowing debtor to exempt land owned in Florida.
Full wild-card exemption allowed where value of homestead not established
The court found that debtors could not claim a homestead exemption for a property that debtors did not occupy (and could not at least establish an intent to occupy at a reasonably close time from their filing).
The court found that two years at a minimum (debtor's intended moving date) to be not reasonably close enough in time.
Court held that Section 522(p) applies only to the equity that the debtors have in their homesteads that they claim as exempt under state law. The federal homestead exemption is not limited by Section 522(p).
Court overruled creditor's objection to the debtor's homestead exemption. The court held that in order to sustain creditor's objection and reduce or eliminate the debtor's exemption, the court would need to find extraordinary circumstances. Here, there simply were none. Debtor's may have intentionally undervalued the claim, but this act of bad faith was not connected to the homestead exemption, so the objection was overruled.
Debtor could not reverse pierce the corporate veil to exempt homestead. As the court said, "This case demonstrates the danger of a debtor being able to raise or lower his corporate shield, depending on which position best protects his property."
Debtor was allowed to exempt money in her bank accounts that she could trace to having come from disability benefits.
The court allowed debtor to apply the homestead exemption to the equity she had in the land adjacent to her residence. The court said a debtor must show both ownership and residence to claim a homestead exemption. Here, the debtor owned a one-eighth interest and used the parcel as part of her homestead. The court found that debtor's partial ownership was enough to satisfy the "ownership" requirement, and her use of the land contiguously with her residence satisfied the "residence" requirement."
The court ruled that a 2005 increase in the New York homestead exemption amount (from $10k to 50k) applied retroactively to debts acquired before the increase occurred. The court said, "Neither the statutory language nor its legislative history requires limiting the scope of the amendment to debts incurred after the amendment's effective date... Accordingly, New York debtors who file a bankruptcy petition after the amendment's effective date are entitled to invoke the greater homestead exemption amount of $50,000."
Michigan law did not exempt homestead in Alabama. The court said, "Michigan courts, for almost one hundred years, have held that its laws do not have extraterritorial application to real property located in another state."
Debtor was allowed to claim a homestead exemption for the family home (even though the deed listed debtor's sister as the owner). The father had died without a will, and debtor held an ownership interest in the house and lived there at time of filing.
Determined that state statute paralleling Sec 522(d)(11)(E) encompasses the lost future earnings portion of a tort award for personal injuries.
Debtor was unable to exempt her homestead because she did not properly claim a homestead exemption for the property. The court ruled that it was not enough to merely claim an exemption in the amount of the property's value -- the debtor had to claim the homestead itself.
Main Case on Doubling of Exemptions:
married couple filing a joint petition was entitled to double the Virginia homestead exemption
Court sustained the trustee's objection to debtor's homestead exemption, because debtor had moved out voluntarily without an intention to return. Because of debtor's actions, she could not prove that she constructively occupied the property.
Like Fernandez, but with a different result. Found that if a person was forced to take another state's exemption, if can apply to property outside that state, even if the state law, only applies to property within the state.
Follows In re Benn in finding Missouri common law exemption not to exist in bankruptcy> Under Missouri's opt out statute, only statutory exemptions are allowed, not common law exemptions, following In Re Benn. Rehearing en banc denied.
Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) are property of the state and are not exempt. under federal exemptions
(Debtor argued account exempt under 522(d(10)(C) or (11)(D))
Few states have exemption for HSAs
If no wildcard available, only practical solution may be to withdraw the funds and pay the tax penalty.
Reaffirming In Re Benn as controlling law when it comes to Missouri Exemptions. Exemptions must be statutory in Missouri under its opt-out law.
$100,000 insuramce proceeds fully exempt as necessary for support for low income debtor with only a few more years till retirement. Federal exeption used. 522(d)(1)(C)
Debtor's IRA with Merrill Lynch was not exempt due to language in a standard Client Relationship Agreement which gave Merrill a Lien on all IRA funds used for Margin or borrowing. Debtor never did either, but the clause itself was enough to render the IRA not exempt, according to the judge.
When a state opts out of federal exemptions, state law determines PROCEDURE as well as substance of exemptions. In this case, they did not file their homestead deed in time required by state law (within 5 days of the 341 meeting date.
Missouri annuity statute is not an valid bankruptcy exemption because it does not contain the words "exempt" - Citing the 8th Cir ruling In re Benn, 491 F.3d 811; 814, 8th Cir., 2007
the fact that debtor did not claim full exemption on Schedule C does not prevent him from applying the full exemption in doing the lein-avoidance calculaitons under section 522(f)(2)(A)(iii).
Exemptions taken in previous Chapter 7 do not bind the current Chapter 13 proceeding where N.Y. state exemptions had substantially increased between first and second filing. Coutt ruled debtor may claim new, higher exemption amounts.
Debtor who left his Texas home to find work in Nevada for two years before returning to Texas and filing bankruptcy lost his Texas homestead exemption, and could not claim Nevada exemption either, according to this court (diverging from two other courts in the same district - In re Camp 396 B.R. 194, W.D.TX, 2008; In re Garrett, 435 B.R. 434, W.D.TX, 2010
Debtor cannot compel trustee to abandon debtpr's partially exempt car. Good explanation of procedure when you have a partial exemption and how you lose your car.
Court allowed debtor to claim as exempt $7000 deposited in bank account that held proceeds from sale of exempt homestead. Court said debtor's pre-bankruptcy exemption planning did not amount to fraud. $7000 was from sale of personal property sold when home was sold.
"In view of these principles and the Eighth Circuit's permissive approach to non-fraudulent, pre-bankruptcy planning,[9] we find the Debtor's establishment of a savings account for the specific purpose of depositing the proceeds of his homestead and his subsequent deposit into that account of the proceeds from the personal property (allegedly) sold with his homestead sufficient indicia of his intent to convert non-exempt personal property into exempt, homestead property. Because the record is devoid of any contrary evidence or evidence that the Debtor acted with fraudulent intent when he converted nonexempt property into exempt property, the Debtor is entitled to claim the entire $87,501.55 in his savings account as his homestead exemption claim."
Utah Debtor allowed to claim Idaho homestead rights despite postpeition statements that she never intended to reside there (with her estranged husband who intended to divorce her.
Exemption amount is fixed at time of filing. Post-petition appreciation goes to trustee. Exemption amount is fixed at the time of filing. Trustee can claim non-exempt equity even after discharge, but before the case is closed. A Chapter 7 debtor will not be certain about the status of a homestead property until the case is closed (something that may not happen for several years after bankruptcy filing) or the trustee abandons the property.
"What is frozen as of the date of filing the petition is the value of the debtor's exemption, not the fair market value of the property claimed as exempt. See Hyman v. Plotkin (In re Hyman), 967 F. 2d 1316, 1320 n.9 (9th Cir. 1992). A number of our cases have held that, under the California exemption scheme, the estate is entitled to postpetition appreciation in the value of property a portion of which is otherwise exempt. See Alsberg v. Robertson (In re Alsberg), 68 F.3d 312, 314-15 (9th Cir. 1995); Hyman, 967 F.2d at 1321; Schwaber v. Reed (In re Reed), 940 F.2d 1317, 1323 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Viet Vu v. Kendall (In re Viet Vu), 245 B.R. 644, 647-48 (9th Cir. BAP 2000).
.....
The debtors argue that the result we reach today will lead to uncertainty about the status of exempt property and abuses by trustees. The facts of the Gebhart bankruptcy suggest that some of these concerns are legitimate. Gebhart remained in his home for five years after filing for bankruptcy, paying his mortgage and believing that his bankruptcy was finished when he received his discharge. Gebhart may have been mistaken in this belief, but his misapprehension was shared by his mortgage lender, which refinanced his home, apparently unaware of any claims on the property by the Trustee. A Chapter 7 debtor will not be certain about the status of a homestead property until the case is closed (something that may not happen for several years after bankruptcy filing) or the trustee abandons the property."
GM vehicle voucher for employees is exempt
"the voucher is appropriately treated as partial compensation for this loss of future earnings. Accordingly, the voucher is exemptible under the New York Debtor & Creditor Law.
Section 282(3)(iv) states that compensation of loss of future earnings is exempt "to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor." In his papers, the trustee has challenged only the exemptible character of the voucher. Giving consideration only to the issue presented, the court will overrule the trustee's objection. To the extent that the trustee may wish now to make a further argument that the voucher is not reasonably necessary for the debtor's support, he may timely move for reconsideration of this decision."
The court ruled that debtor's right to receive alimony payments from ex-husband were exempt.
Massachusetts law merely requires that a homestead claimant "occupy or intend to occupy said home as a principal residence."
Even though the debtor allegedly intended to sell his home when he recorded the homestead, the exemption was valid because the debtor met the requirement (that is, he occupied the property as his principal residence at the time that he claimed the homestead).
Inherited funds from debtor's mother's IRA account were not exempt under Section 522(d)(12).
Compensation from personal injury award was allowed as an exemption (under Section 522(d)(11)). Specifically, the court disagreed with the trustee's argument that the debtor's injury needed to be permanent in order to be exempt. The debtor's injuries caused him to miss work for three months, and still caused him pain two years after the accident were (according to the court) sufficiently severe to be exempt.
Note: the "asset" here is the right to the damages from the personal injury award.
Debtor and her spouse are co-owners of the annuity, and their children are listed as beneficiaries. Court ruled that exemption Mich. Comp. Laws Section 500.4054 did not protect annuity owners against creditor claims against the non-beneficiary owners of the annuity.
"A straightforward reading of [Mich. Comp. Laws Section 500.4054] discloses that it does not protect the insured against claims his or her creditors make on the proceeds of the insurance or annuity fund. Rather, the statute protects the insurer from claims that beneficiaries' creditors make on the proceeds of the fund. This statute does not allow Debtor, the 'insured,' to exempt her interest in the annuity."
The court did not allow debtors to exempt proceeds from a personal injury claim, because debtors intentionally and fraudulently attempted to conceal the claim.
Debtor's home placed in a Living Trust had a valid homestead exemption.
Debtor's alimony award from a divorce decree was exempt.
"Future earnings" under 522(d)(11)(E) referred only to post-petition earnings, not post-injury earnings that preceded petition.
Federal wages exemption 522(d)(11)(E) for "future earnings" only exempts wages that are postpetition and necessary for support. Here debtor claimed as exempt and entire 135K wrongful termination settlement as exempt wages. Court held that amount was exempt only to the extent that it was for postpetition earnings, and then only to the extent needed for support. Applying that standard, debtor was allowed to exempt only $16,550 of the court settlement.
Debtor could amend filing to switch from Federal to state homestead exemption (over objection of Trustee), but was limited by MA homestead law to the applying the homestead only to parcel that was described in the declaration of homestead, which did not include his adjoining parcel.
Debtors may assert homestead exemption in property the own but don't live in, provided that family lives in the property.
Wife forced to take federal exemptions, husband forced to take state exemptions.
Entire moblile home park was debtor's homestead.
Section 522(p) homestead limitation's 1215 day period runs from date of ownership of the property, not from the date of declaration of homestead.
Debtors declined to use a homestead exemption (deciding to reaffirm their mortgage instead), and the court held that they could not then use a wild card exemption meant for debtors without ability to claim a homestead exemption. The court reasoned that "In the context of Fla.Stat. Section 222.25(4) [the wild card exemption statute], the phrase 'receive the benefits of'... refers to the legal right or advantage the Florida Constitution confers upon a homestead owner, regardless of whether the owner actually relies on the privilege."
Money that debtors deposited into a college savings account several days prior to filing for Chapter 7 relief was held as non-exempt property of the bankruptcy estate.
The court said, "Debtors' lack of ability to direct the investments or the funds in the College Account is not a sufficient restriction for Section 541(c)(2) purposes."
Court allowed debtor to take a "head of family" exemption even though he was living apart from his wife at the time, because he was still financially supporting his family.
Applying and explaining Florida Tenancy by the Entireties exemption to a case in Illinois allowing debtor to exempt land owned in Florida.
Full wild-card exemption allowed where value of homestead not established
The court found that debtors could not claim a homestead exemption for a property that debtors did not occupy (and could not at least establish an intent to occupy at a reasonably close time from their filing).
The court found that two years at a minimum (debtor's intended moving date) to be not reasonably close enough in time.
Court held that Section 522(p) applies only to the equity that the debtors have in their homesteads that they claim as exempt under state law. The federal homestead exemption is not limited by Section 522(p).
Court overruled creditor's objection to the debtor's homestead exemption. The court held that in order to sustain creditor's objection and reduce or eliminate the debtor's exemption, the court would need to find extraordinary circumstances. Here, there simply were none. Debtor's may have intentionally undervalued the claim, but this act of bad faith was not connected to the homestead exemption, so the objection was overruled.
Debtor could not reverse pierce the corporate veil to exempt homestead. As the court said, "This case demonstrates the danger of a debtor being able to raise or lower his corporate shield, depending on which position best protects his property."
Debtor was allowed to exempt money in her bank accounts that she could trace to having come from disability benefits.
The court allowed debtor to apply the homestead exemption to the equity she had in the land adjacent to her residence. The court said a debtor must show both ownership and residence to claim a homestead exemption. Here, the debtor owned a one-eighth interest and used the parcel as part of her homestead. The court found that debtor's partial ownership was enough to satisfy the "ownership" requirement, and her use of the land contiguously with her residence satisfied the "residence" requirement."
The court ruled that a 2005 increase in the New York homestead exemption amount (from $10k to 50k) applied retroactively to debts acquired before the increase occurred. The court said, "Neither the statutory language nor its legislative history requires limiting the scope of the amendment to debts incurred after the amendment's effective date... Accordingly, New York debtors who file a bankruptcy petition after the amendment's effective date are entitled to invoke the greater homestead exemption amount of $50,000."
Michigan law did not exempt homestead in Alabama. The court said, "Michigan courts, for almost one hundred years, have held that its laws do not have extraterritorial application to real property located in another state."
Debtor was allowed to claim a homestead exemption for the family home (even though the deed listed debtor's sister as the owner). The father had died without a will, and debtor held an ownership interest in the house and lived there at time of filing.
Determined that state statute paralleling Sec 522(d)(11)(E) encompasses the lost future earnings portion of a tort award for personal injuries.
Debtor was unable to exempt her homestead because she did not properly claim a homestead exemption for the property. The court ruled that it was not enough to merely claim an exemption in the amount of the property's value -- the debtor had to claim the homestead itself.
Main Case on Doubling of Exemptions:
married couple filing a joint petition was entitled to double the Virginia homestead exemption
Court sustained the trustee's objection to debtor's homestead exemption, because debtor had moved out voluntarily without an intention to return. Because of debtor's actions, she could not prove that she constructively occupied the property.
Like Fernandez, but with a different result. Found that if a person was forced to take another state's exemption, if can apply to property outside that state, even if the state law, only applies to property within the state.
Missouri opt out law requires the word "exempt" to appear in a statute for it to be a valid exemption in bankruptcy. As such, laws that only restrict "garnishment or attachment" may not qualify as exemptions.
Follows In re Benn in finding Missouri common law exemption not to exist in bankruptcy> Under Missouri's opt out statute, only statutory exemptions are allowed, not common law exemptions, following In Re Benn. Rehearing en banc denied.
All Cases A to Z
If you're not familiar with what "case law" is, and how to use it, check out Chapter 7 of Nolo's LegalResearch: How to Find and Understand the Law for a guide to how to read through a case to get the parts that matter.
Also, you need to be familiar with the concept of "jurisdiction." Here are some helpful links:
When you read a case, check to make sure that the case's decision applies to your local district. Do this by looking at which court has decided the case -- either the U.S. Supreme Court, a court of appeal (listed here in large type), or a district court (listed in small type). Your local district court judge is not bound to follow the opinion of judges from other district courts, but often they look to these cases for advice. Your local district, however, is bound to follow decisions in cases from it governing circuit court. You'll see fairly few Supreme Court case here, but those cases are also binding on all districts."
NO! NO! NO! This is a start for your research. New cases are constantly being decided. I update this when I have time. This is only a fraction of the actual published opinions out there. Dozens of cases are handed down nationwide every week. I catalog interesting ones when I have time. They are meant to serve as a starting point for your research -- NOT as a comprehensive listing of the current state of the law.